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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, the purpose is to analyze the dynamism in the 
US- Japanese economic relations between 1945- 1997; with 
regard to the hegemonic stability theory. After stating the basic 
assumptions of the theory; the economic decline of the US and 
the rise of Japan are explained and illustrated. Future prospects 
for the bilateral relations of the two and the future of the world 
economic leadership are given; following an overall look to the 
relations. As a response to the question which country the 
hegemon is today; the thesis concludes that after the Pax 
Americana era, there is no hegemon in the face of the US losing 
its strength in the economic arena and Japan not qualified to 
assume the role, due to its inadequacy in the military sphere. 
According to the hegemonic stability theory, the two politically 
powerful countries with their strengths emanating from different 
sources, do not offer a hegemonic solution but their bilateral 
relations and cooperation with other advanced countries (G - 7) 
are vital for an orderly functioning liberal world economy.
Ill
ÖZET
Bu tezin amacı; 1945- 1997 yılları arasında 
Amerikan- Japon ekonomik ilişkilerindeki değişimin, 
hegemonik istikrar kuramı temel alınarak incelenmesidir. 
Kuramın temel prensipleri belirtildikten sonra; Amerika’nın 
ekonomik açıdan gerilemesi ve Japonya’nın yükselişi tablo 
ve grafiklerle açıklanmıştır. İkili ilişkiler ve dünya 
ekonomisinin geleceği konusundaki düşünceler, ekonomik 
ilişkilerin yer aldığı bölümden sonra gelmektedir. Pax 
Amerikan döneminden sonra Amerika’nın ekonomik alanda 
gerilemesi ve Japonya’nın da askeri açıdan yeterli güce 
sahip olmaması sonucu, bir hegemonun olmaması, bu 
çalışmanın ortaya çıkardığı bir sonuçtur. Hegemonya 
dengesi kuramına göre, politik güçleri değişik alanlardan 
kaynaklanan Amerika ve Japonya’nın hegemonyaları söz 
konusu değildir. Ancak ikili ilişkileri ve diğer gelişmiş 
ülkelerle işbirlikleri (G- 7), liberal dünya ekonomisinin 
düzeni açısından son derece önemlidir.
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UNITED STATES - JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1945-1997) :
A HEGEMONIC QUEST?
I. INTRODUCTION:
The purpose of this thesis is to study the impact of American- Japanese 
relations on the global economy by using the hegemonic stability theory. The 1990s 
have witnessed tremendous changes in the international system, owing to the end 
of the Cold War, brought by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The victory of 
liberalism versus communism in both economic and political spheres has led to 
debates over a new world order. The bipolar stability and predictability gave way 
to a " unimultipolar" world as Samuel P. Huntington calls it'. This is because we 
are living in a world of multi-power centres militarily dominated by the US after 
the demise of the Soviet Union.
The liberal world that experienced the prosperity and security of the 
international regimes under the US guarantee during the Cold War, is at a turning 
point as the US is exhausted economically at a time when the economic sphere has 
surpassed the military in the priority charts The end of the Soviet threat legitimizes 
the debate that there no longer is a need for large defense budgets, but for 
economic welfare programmes. So, the US allies that prospered under the US 
security umbrella seem to be more advantageous today given their economic 
powers and potential for influence in the international affairs. Through realist 
glasses, a world of international economic competition and thus protectionism 
makes more sense than a borderless, cooperative world economy when it is
realized that the priority of national interest has not changed but concentrated on 
economics rather than security affairs.
Another systemic change - change in the structure of the international 
political economics- brought by the end of the Cold War is the increasing 
regionalization of the world economy mainly into three trading blocs: the 
Americas, the European Community and the Asia- Pacific region under the 
leadership of Japan\ Despite the optimism that the world is moving towards a 
more global, liberal open economy and free trade, the persistence of protectionist 
measures, managed trade ( through bilateral arrangements) and inefficiency of 
international economic institutions, lead to realpolitik calculations and complicate 
the management of the system without the US capacity to sustain the regimes''.
The hegemonic stability theory of neorealists, formulated in the early 
1970s, focuses on this nature of the international system and argues that a 
hegemon is the guarantee for the operation and continuation of regimes. The 
distribution of power in the international system and the changing economic and 
military balances determine the hegemonl In the words of Robert W. Cox, to be a
hegemon:
“ a state would have to found and protect a world order that was universal in 
conception, i.e., not an order directly expressing the interest of one state but 
an order that most states could find compatible with their interests given 
their different levels of power and lesser abilities to change that order. The 
less powerful states could live with the order even if they could not change
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So the hegemon should have the most efficient economy capable to meet 
hegejnonic costs (draining its economy as Gilpin states) and the military means 
needed to protect the system’. The US, the leader of Americas, Japan, the leader of
Asia-Pacific respectively seem to be the candidates for the future global leadership. 
The former's military and the latter's economic supremacy put them into that 
position. In a way, these two states have shared the two hegemonic dimensions: 
economic power and politico-military power*.
The Cold War, which changed Japan from an ex - enemy to a US ally 
contributed to its strength and later its demise, quickly reintegrating this country 
into the world political system. This important geopolitical development has 
increased the importance of Japan since the Japanese economy has become the 
center of international politics as security dependence of Japan on the US has 
become less vital with the removal of the Soviet threats At the same time, other 
than being an important member of Group 7 ( G-7 ) -club of the world's leading 
industrial countries - Japan has created a kind of Asian co-prosperity, 
strengthening its position in the Pacific. But Japan is moving with very cautious 
steps despite the international especially American pressure on it, to be more 
assertive politically. Meanwhile, the United States is trying to continue playing its 
global role with simultaneous attempts to manage its chronic budget and trade 
deficits'®. The advocates of benefiting a larger " peace dividend" insist for a 
different budgetary allocation, with less emphasis on the military and urge Japan 
for more burden sharing. In fact, according to the understanding that politics and 
economics are inseparable; Japan, due to its extensive economic activities in the 
world, will have to develop a foreign policy in which she will have greatly 
expanded roles". Otherwise only as an economic power, it is not possible for Japan 
to be a truly global power. Japan is expected to end its postwar pacifist sentiment
and participate in concerted action for coping with regional conflicts, nuclear 
proliferation, management of the world economy and environmental issues'^. The 
United States can no longer afford to deal with all global issues, as it did in the 
post- war era. Japan can not remain a " free rider " concerning the international 
public goods'^.
It is the structural characteristics of the international system that determine 
the weakening or strengthening of a state as a hegemon. Today, first of all the 
possession of nuclear weapons makes states less willing to solve disputes through 
armed conflict. Also, the increasing economic interdependence and interests of 
states in international commerce create a common interest of sustaining stability in 
the world economy. What is more is the economic challenge of Japan that became 
apparent with the export-led economic growth strategy of the 1970s and its role 
beginning in the 1980s, as the world's foremost creditor nation'“’. Japan has become 
the economic power, supporting US foreign policy goals and budgeting the deficits 
of the ex-hegemon'^. In the face of the US economic decline, the US-Japanese 
relation turns out to reflect a division of labor, with Japan as the financial leader 
and US as the political/military leader'^.But the crucial point is that the US and 
Japan are two separate states with their own interests, the reconciliation of which 
will be difficult in the absence of the Cold War criteria.
The hegemonic responsibilities require a continuing economic surplus to be 
used for “consumption, production and protection ". But the US economic surplus 
has disappeared since the 1980s, facing the country with the problem of financing 
its commitments'’. The historic reversal of the financial positions of the US and
Japan has taken place during the Reagan administration in the US. The export-led 
growth strategy of Japan and its closure to imports other than raw materials had 
created a surplus in Japan's trade and payments balances'*. The Japanese need for a 
market to get rid of its financial surpluses coincided with the US need to stimulate 
domestic consumption in America and go on with the military expenditures, despite 
the large budget deficit"'. This type of a " symbiotic " relationship increased the 
Japanese investments in the US and changed the latter into a debtor nation though 
it seemed to be a short-term solution to finance the deficit^“.The result was the 
"Nichibei " economy which meant the increasingly integrated Japanese and 
American economies and became the key economic relationship in the world^'.
The main economic problems of the US are the budget deficit, low savings 
rate inadequate for investments, inefficient education and training of the American 
work force and inadequate spending on In the face of these problems the
US sees Japanese economic power as a strategic threat; there are even people 
calling this rivalry an economic war with Japan''\ Also, the serious imbalances in 
trade between the US and Japan are a " fact ". This friction that has grown in the 
second half of the Cold War became acute especially in the early 1990s. Japan has 
been criticized for the adverse effects of its protectionism during the world 
recession of 1991 and 1992. Rather than advantages that Japanese trade and 
investment have brought to the US, the monopolistic Japanese trade practices and 
non-tariff market barriers have been debated in trade negotiations^“'. Especially the 
unsuccessful GATT summits have been good examples to show the lack of US 
leadership in the economic sphere and the circumstances of the post hegemonic
era^  ^ In Frank Langdon's words; " perhaps it will take a global environmental crisis 
as serious as a cold war to supply the stimulus and leadership needed"^ ®. It is 
obvious that today there is no hegemon.
For the current global economic problems, which are uncertainties in the 
liberal multilateral trading system, the increasing gap between the developed and 
developing countries, the difficulties of making reforms in the economies of former 
socialist countries and the world-wide shortage of capital; there is need for 
cooperation especially in three respects. These are, creation of a non 
discriminatory, multilateral trading system; maintenance of successful 
transformation of former command economies into a global liberal economy and 
economic assistance to the developing countries^^ For achieving the stated aims, 
there is need for Japanese collaboration and working institutional arrangements. 
This may either mean strengthening the existing institutions, adapting them or 
creating new ones, for handling the emerging issues^ '*. A possible threat to the 
institutional fabric is that the increasing heterogeneity in the membership of 
international organizations may cause instabilities. But the fact that the world 
economy is regionalized may help, since the leaders of different regions ( Japan, 
Europe and US ) would check its own backyard· This is in case the post 
hegemonic era remains fragmented economically. In fact a scenario could be 
coequal, shared global leadership by the US and Japan, if their political interests 
coincide.
With these in mind, in this thesis the changing balances in the economic and 
political relations between the US and Japan since the 1970s will be dwelled on.
The main emphasis will be to analyze the nature of the alliance especially in the 
post - hegemonic era and dynamics of change will be studied. Through the 
theoretical framework of realism, more specifically the hegemonic stability theory; 
the global political economics will be evaluated with regard to power capabilities 
of the US and Japan. In Chapter 2, the hegemonic stability theory is elaborated. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on the economic decline of the US and the rise of Japan. 
The US-Japan economic relations are the topic of Chapter 4. At the conclusion, 
Chapter 5 offers some future prospects for the global leadership and the US-Japan 
bilateral relations.
U. THE THEORY OF HEGEMONIC STABILITY
A. Anarchy versus Cooperation in the International System
The anarchic nature that realism argues the international system has, is due 
to the absence of an authoritative government to enact and enforce rules of 
behavior among states which are the major actors of international affairs. Self help 
which is accepted as the rule, implies that nation - states rely on their own means 
and arrangements for achieving their self interests, bringing wars, conflicts and 
discord as the result. ' The basic assumptions of the realist school that are also 
shared by neorealist scholars (Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, 
Robert W. Tucker, George Modelski, Charles Kindleberger and Robert Gilpin) are: 
the conflictual, anarchical nature of international affairs, accepting order, justice 
and morality as exceptions; the nation-state as the essence of social reality and 
nationalism as the basic loyalty; belief in primacy of power and security in political 
life as the basic human motivation Different from classical realism, neorealists 
have rediscovered the economic component of international affairs, as a result of 
the surfacing of economic factors in the 1970s. R. Gilpin states that this was not 
due to a crisis in realist thought but was due to a crisis in world capitalism. 
According to neorealism, the international political system determines the 
framework for economic activities. Therefore the international economic arena is 
not autonomous as liberals argue and is not the driving force behind politics as 
Marxists claim. It is assumed that economic factors have effect on the distribution
of wealth and power, but do operate in the context of political struggle among 
states. Hence changes take place first in the political then in the economic sphere, 
as a result of the former^. The theory of hegemonic stability, developed by 
neorealists, tries to examine the dynamics of international political economy 
through this perspective and puts forth the conditions under which cooperation 
among nations is possible, despite anarchy prevailing in the system.
B. The Theoiy of Hegemonic Stability
The theory first put forth by Charles Kindleberger, in the form of a theory 
of "leadership" or "responsibility", argues that an open and liberal world economy 
requires the existence of a hegemonic or dominant power. As Robert Keohane 
states, hegemony by a single country makes it possible to develop strong 
international regimes, the rules of which are precise and well-obeyed. The hegemon 
is able and willing to establish and maintain the norms and rules of a liberal 
economic order and with its decline, the liberal economic order is greatly 
weakened Hegemony, in the economic sense, is preponderance of material 
resources. Immanuel Wallerstein defines hegemony as "a situation in which the 
ongoing rivalry between the so-called 'great powers' is so unbalanced Hiat one 
power is truly primus inter pares; that is , one power can largely impose its rules 
and its wishes ( at the very least by effective veto power) in the economic, political, 
military, diplomatic and even cultural arenas" So it is the liberal hegemonic 
power that provides the favorable political environment for the successful 
operation of the market*^ . But for the development of the liberal international
economy, the hegemon itself must be committed to values of liberalism, otherwise 
the system can easily be turned into imperialism through imposition of political and 
economic restrictions on lesser powers. The powerful states other than the 
hegemon should also have interest in the growth of market relations, since the 
hegemon cannot compel them to follow the rules. This brings us to three 
prerequisites of Gilpin for the emergence and continuation of the liberal system:
1. Hegemony
2. Liberal ideology
3. Common interests.
For the other states to accept the rule by the hegemon, there must be a 
general belief in the need for and legitimacy of this rule. The necessary support 
requires a considerable degree of ideological consensus’. It is the prestige and 
status of the hegemon in the international political system that makes other states 
accept the rule. The moment when they regard the actions of the hegemon as self- 
serving and contrary to their own political and economic interests, the system 
begins to be weakened. Or if the citizenry of the hegemon believes that the other 
states are cheating or if the costs exceed the perceived benefits, then again the 
system deteriorates*.
According to David Lake, the theory of hegemonic stability is in fact a 
research program consisting of two distinct theories^. The former one, "leadership 
theory" is built upon the public goods model and aims to explain the production of 
the international economic infrastructure which is international stability. The 
leadership may be both " benevolent" or " coercive" depending on the
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circumstances. On the other hand, the latter one, the hegemony theory, focuses on 
different trade policy preferences of states and seeks to explain international 
economic openness*“. The term international economic openness is defined as the 
sum of free trade and protectionist elements in the foreign economic policies of at 
least the largest states within the system. Lake argues that these two theories are 
not incompatible; even some variants state that countries can be leaders and 
hegemons at the same time. But one point to be emphasized is that hegemony 
should be coercive, as a difference from prerequisites of leadership’*. Charles 
Kindleberger, who exemplifies leadership theoiy according to Lake, explains that a 
single leader is necessary for the provision of the public good of international 
stability. Lake prefers to call this term as international economic infrastructure. 
Political scientists Norman Fröhlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer have first put forth 
the idea that public goods would be underproduced in absence of a leader to bear 
the disproportionate share of costs’^ . ( Seeing the concept" hegemon" as equal to 
" threat, pressure, force", Kindleberger has preferred to use the term " leadership", 
in explaining how to sustain international stability.)
Concerning the second component of the hegemonic stability research 
program, which is the hegemony theory; the openness of international economy 
becomes the dependent variable and is the result of strategic interaction and 
bargaining of self-interested states. Since free trade or economic openness are 
desired by the hegemon, it is coercive, exercising power in order to change the 
policies of other states to satisfy its own goals. The coercion may take place either 
in the form of negative sanctions ( threats) or positive ones ( rewards). So the
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hegemony theory is not based on a public goods model and free-riding is not the 
main political problem. On the contrary, what is problematic is the incompatible 
trade policies of competing states'^. A new version of the leadership theory adds 
that a group of states may replace the single leader*“*. Lake agrees with Krasner's 
argument that openness can be achieved under either hegemony or a system of 
many small, highly developed states, as long as it is in their interest to sustain 
openness.
C. Basic Assumptions of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability
The study of hegemony has interested many scholars since concentration of 
power in the hands of one state is important on the course of interstate political 
relations. Despite many versions of the theory, there are two basic assumptions:
1. The dominant actor declines or disappears.
2. As a result, all others undergo ( or the world undergoes) a period of crisis and 
instability*^ Charles Kindleberger argues that there has to be a stabilizer - one 
stabilizer, for the world.
"Four secondary theorems, found in works of R. Gilpin and C. 
Kindleberger are as follows:
1. Theorem a ( the benevolence argument) : The hegemon is 
benevolent and predatory behavior is considered as defensive, taking 
place only in the face of exploitation by smaller countries.
2. Theorem b ( the leadership argument) : Harmony and cooperation 
are extremely difficult or impossible without a hegemon. ( Regime 
tlieorists, e.g. Keohane do not agree with this.)
3. Theorem c ( the "state of grace" argument) : A hannony of interests 
can emerge due to the leader and a positive-sum-game world is 
possible, hence the transactions are benign in times of hegemony“ .^
4. Theorem d ( the hegemon's dilemma argument) : The hegemonic 
responsibility is altruistic in the sense that the hegemon upholds the 
system to its detriment, though it weakens in time. This has been stated 
in different forms in the literature:
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(a) The Triffm dilemma of hegemonic currency; The hegemon when 
providing the system with liquidity and a common currency for 
international transactions, undermines tlie confidence of markets and 
central banks in its own currency, so weakening its own position.
(b) The investment dilemma: The hegemon's overseas investments may 
undermine its competitiveness by developing potential challengers.
(c) The technology spread dilemma: The hegemon forgoes its advanced 
technologies, tlirough international aid and investment.
(d) The open market dilenuna: It is a responsibility of the hegemon to 
police a regime of free trade. It should open its own market even if  the 
free riders do not reciprocate, hence the hegemon may be threatened 
with a balance of payments deficit and be worse by a loss of 
competitiveness, as a result of technological spread.
(c) The" small c.xploit the rich" dilemma: The hegemon pays more than 
its fair share for public goods, in tliis way is exploited by small, free 
riding nations'^."
In the hegemonic stability theory, a powerful actant guarantees the 
existence and effective functioning of the system. The hegemon provides and 
protects the system by bearing a disproportionate share of costs. Hegemony is 
especially seen as a solution to the problem of provision of " public goods" 
Gilpin takes the open market economy as a collective or public good. A collective 
good is one, the consumption of which by an individual, household or firm does 
not reduce the amount available for other potential consumers'^’. This condition is 
called the "jointness" of public goods^". Also, public goods are " nonexcludable" 
which means that the actors can not be excluded from consumption, whether they 
contribute to the costs of provision or not^'. So, what is problematic is that the 
recipients may prefer “free-riding”, causing suboptimal production of the goods^^. 
Under hegemony, which is a partial solution; the largest participant of the 
economic system may have sufficient incentive to produce public goods even 
without guarantee that others will contribute their shares, because it will also be 
the largest beneficiary of the utilization of public goods^^ The ability of the
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hegemon to provide public goods and solve collective action problems, makes 
hegemonic governance desirable. C. Kindleberger's well-known example showing 
the value of hegemony is about world monetary stability during the inter-war 
period. During this era, Great Britain had lost its hegemonic status but its position 
was not filled by the United States yet. The result was the Great Depression and 
many states had to raise tariff barriers and devalue their currencies to protect their 
national interests. No strong nation was willing to assert financial leadership and 
stabilize the situation, hence the results were catastrophic.
According to Gilpin, another important function that makes the hegemon 
crucial is the fact that the hegemonic power becomes a model showing the benefits 
of a market system and works as an engine of growth for other economies, through 
its imports, investments, transfer of technology and diffusion of knowledge^^ The 
economic component of power is more important than the military for the 
hegemon to exert influence in the international system. As Robert Keohane states 
"the hegemon must have control over raw materials, sources of capital, markets 
and have competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods." The 
control of financial capital, particular technologies and natural resources are 
important means of leadership. Hirschman argues that even threat of trade, finance 
or technology cut off can be an important means of leverage of hegemon over 
other states^ ®. The theory puts forth that the hegemon or dominant power assumes 
leadership in dealing with a particular issue. So the theory has been applied to a 
wide range of issue areas such as; exchange of money, trade, finance, health, 
environment, communications, air transportation, fishing, navigation on high
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seas.... In this way, the hegemon influences the other states to cohere and establish 
rules of conduct, in different fields of international relations.
The theory of hegemonic stability is one of the approaches explaining the 
creation of "international regimes" to govern different issue areas. The proponents 
of the theory who apply it to the question of regime development assume that the 
structure of the international system ( distribution of capabilities and power) 
determines the possibilities of cooperation^’. Brilmayer, who finds regime theory 
akin to the theory of hegemonic stability states that regimes can also facilitate the 
provision of public goods but the degree of their effectiveness without a hegemon 
is disputable’*^. Also there are authors ( e.g. Keohane, Snidal) that are optimistic 
about the possibility of collective action in the absence of hegemony, arguing that 
cooperation can persist through inertia’ .^ John Ruggie argues that after the 
establishment of some international institutions such as International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank and international money and trade regimes; there is a " non 
state" internationalization of authority which facilitates continuation of the system 
as one o f " embedded liberalism", as a fusion of power, interests and legitimate 
social purpose in the major capitalist states^ *^. The hegemon that plays an important 
role in the operation of world economy by creating international regimes that are 
"principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue area". It has responsibility to prevent 
cheating, free riding and enforce rules of a liberal economy, encouraging others to 
share the costs of maintaining the system. According to the theory, if there were no 
hegemonic power to create and manage international regimes, the international
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economy would be unstable since liberalism and free trade would give way to
economic nationalism^*.
For Keohane, hegemony and international regimes may be complementary, 
or even- to some extent- substitutes for each other since they both serve to make 
agreements possible and to facilitate compliance with rules^ .^ He believes that 
cooperation does not necessarily require the existence of a hegemon, after the 
establishment of international regimes. Keohane insists on possibility of non 
hegemonic cooperation and that this can be facilitated through international 
regimes. One reason why governments value regimes is that it is easier to maintain 
regimes than change them” . International regimes do not imply a new international 
order beyond nation states; they are arrangements motivated by self- interest, 
where sovereignty remains a constitutive principle. The exploration of the 
evolution of the norms and rules of a regime is a means of studying continuity and 
change in world political economy '^*. Keohane, who finds realism weak in 
accounting for change, especially when the sources of change lie in the world 
political economy or in the domestic structures of states shows Gilpin's cycles of 
hegemony as an achievement^^ Gilpin, in explaining " change" emphasizes 
hegemonic wars as the basic mechanism of systemic change^ .^ After a hegemonic 
war, power is redistributed, a new hierarchy of prestige is established and this 
determines which new states will govern the international system. Gilpin's solution 
to static realism that can not explain change is that institutions and rules may in 
time become inconsistent with power realities; bringing the result of decline of 
hegemonic states. He explains hegemonic decline with " the law of uneven growth"
16
" According to realism, lire fundamental cause of wars among states and 
changes in international systems is the uneven growth of power among states. 
Realist writers from Thucydides and Mac Kinder to present- day scholars have 
attributed tlie dynamics of international relations to the fact that the distribution 
of power in an international system sliifts over a period of time; this shift results 
in profound changes in the relationships among the states and eventually 
changes in the nature of the international system itself."
Here, there are three main assumptions of Gilpin:
1. According to the law of diminishing returns, the growth of every society 
describes an S shaped curve.
2. Hegemonic states tend increasingly to consume more and invest less.
3. Hegemonic states decline due to a process of diffusion of technology to others, 
in a way, helping to create challenging powers^’.
There are two alternatives for a declining great power: to increase resources or to 
decrease costs. Most frequently, the dominant state is not able to find additional 
resources or reduce its costs. The result is an acute disequilibrium and the rise of 
another power trying to transform the system in ways advancing its interests while 
the declining hegemon tries to maintain its position. Consequently, the international 
system experiences tensions and crises. According to Gilpin, throughout history, 
the primary means of resolving such a disequilibrium between the structure of the 
international system and the redistribution of power has been "hegemonic war"^*. 
Every international system has been a result of the territorial, economic and 
diplomatic realignments following hegemonic struggles that determine who will 
govern the system. The defining characteristics of a hegemonic war are the 
following:
1. It involves a direct contest between the dominant powers ( rising challengers).
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2. The main issue at stake is the nature and governance of the system^ .^
3. It is characterized by the unlimited means employed and by the general scope of 
the warfare"**^ .
The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of 
growth, expansion and eventual decline. The redistribution of power goes on 
according to the law of uneven growth and equilibriums that continue for some 
time are reached through wars since mankind is not successful at the use of an 
effective mechanism of peaceful change''\ In this way, Gilpin explains the dynamics 
of international political economy.
D. Two Cases of Hegemonic Stability : Pax Britannica and Pax Americana
" Since the Industrial Revolution, two successive hegemonic powers in the 
global system; Great Britain and the United States have sought to organize 
political, territorial and especially economic relations, in terms of their respective 
security and economic interests"“*^. Their partial successes have been due to the 
imposition of their will on lesser states and also because other states have benefited 
from their leadership and provision of public goods ( security, protection of 
property rights) in exchange for revenue. In studying hegemonic stability, two 
spheres have to be distinguished: economy and security. In the economic field, 
both Pax Britannica and Pax Americana enforced liberal economic rules, fostering 
free trade and freedom of capital movements, supplying the key currency and 
managing the international monetary system. For these two great powers, it was 
profitable to assume these responsibilities since the outcome was a secure status
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quo, free trade, foreign investment and a well- functioning international monetary 
system; all surpassing the costs of sustaining them. Meanwhile lesser states 
benefited from the international political and economic status quo as well'‘^
The era of Pax Britannica began with the end of the Napoleonic Wars and 
continued till the outbreak of the First World War. The success of the British 
liberal economy owing to the political triumph of a middle class committed to 
liberalism, general acceptance of liberal ideas in the international system and 
recognized benefits of free trade led states to negotiation of tariff reductions and 
opening of their borders to the world market.
The second hegemonic era, that of the United States began following the 
Second World War'*'*. As the victor of the war, the US expanded economically and 
dominated the world economy, and supported the global monetary system through 
the Bretton Woods agreement‘*^  The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been established, and 
trade barriers have been reduced. Under American leadership, the basic means of 
liberalizing global trade was bilateral agreements with unconditional most-favored- 
nation clauses. GATT itself was a package of 123 bilateral trade agreements 
intending to expand international trade. Since each agreement contained a MFNC 
(Most Favored Nation Clause), each signer was given the same concessions that 
the other nation had conceded to all· the other countries at the conference with 
which it had concluded agreements‘‘^  The United States, after understanding that 
the post - war world-wide recovery depended on the reconstruction of intra - 
European trade, insisted that European states reduce discrimination against one
19
another, but be able to discriminate as a group against non European states. So 
tariff barriers and quotas against the United States were justified on the ground of 
increasing and liberalizing trade'*’.
As the economic hegemon, the United States had the responsibility of 
making an asymmetric bargain; opening its own borders for easing protectionism 
by others. In this way, the United States was able to knit together a political 
coalition of liberal, democratic, capitalist countries; hence the system created was 
subsystemic, excluding the fascist states in the 1930s and the Soviet bloc, 
beginning in the 1940s'***. For the sake of its long term interests, the United States 
has carried the burden of short- term and additional costs. These costs rise due to 
free rider problems and the hegemon has to pay more than its share'’^ . The other 
states benefit from the large size of the hegemon's market, the opening of which 
may cause the latter to lose. All through the post war era, the United States has 
sustained an international economy, disproportionately advantageous to other 
countries^ **. But the central role of the US currency has been a means of power^'. " 
The right of seigniorage", profit that comes to the seigneur (sovereign power) from 
the issuance of money has been used to its own advantage. The United States has 
made a successful use of its financial power to reward friends and punish enemies. 
An important role of the hegemon is "crisis management" for the survival of a 
liberal world economy that the United States has sustained as a result of its 
strength with regard to three of the most commonly used dimensions of national 
power base : GNP, military expenditures and manufacturing production.
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B. Russett argues that American preponderance though not adequate to set 
all the rules for the entire world system, permitted it to establish the basic 
principles for a new economic order in 80 percent of the world economy, 
controlled by capitalist states. This 80 percent constituted a collective security 
system under political and economic control by the United States^ .^ Giovanni 
Arrighi distinguishes between two types of achievements of the United States: in 
security and economy. The former achivement concentrates upon the pacification 
of relations among capitalist states hence bringing a peace based on deterrence, 
through maintenance of stable boundaries between the capitalist and communist 
worlds. A second gain according to Arrighi in the post war era has been the 
decolonization process supported by the United States; in this way opening these 
previously closed markets, sources of raw material, to the world economy” . Thus 
the Third World was opened to capitalism.
Concerning the hegemonic decline of the United States that began in early 
1970s, A. Stein states it was due to the " hegemonic dilemma" which is a situation 
in which the hegemon can not choose between either committing itself to openness 
to maximize its returns ( regardless of what others do) or activating a policy of 
continued closure in order to maximize its " relative" position in the system” . The 
United States has tried to use its position to protect its status especially in the 
1980s, cooperating with major capitalist states for financing its hegemonic 
responsibilities” . Paul Kennedy explains the decline of the United States with his 
thesis of " imperial overstretch" which implies that extension of ambitions of great 
powers beyond the limits of their resources leads to their decline” . Today there is
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disagreement over whether Pax Americana is at an end or not. Contrary to those 
that believe the era ended and a post hegemonic one began; there are proponents 
of the understanding that despite the decline of the United States " relative" to its 
former position, it is still the first power at least in the economic sphere” . What 
has changed is the use of its economic power for the United States; priority is no 
longer given to the establishment of a world capitalist order but to the pursuit of 
national interests, such as increasing domestic economic growth^*. This line of 
reasoning insists on the vitality of the US position today, concerning global politics 
and economics and the continuation of the structure it has created in the liberal 
system.
E. Critiques of Hegemonic Stability Theory
The theory of hegemonic stability is criticized for its certain assumptions. 
One aspect challenged is the existence of international collective goods. Some 
argue that there are no real international collective goods since goods like trade 
and monetary regimes are used by a very small number of states. They explain that 
the international collective goods do not meet the two requirements for this, status; 
namely indivisibility and nonappropriability. The former means that the 
consumption of the good by one does not preclude consumption by another; the 
latter implies that no one can be denied access to the good. In the light of these; 
the critics say that requirements can easily be violated and consumption of one 
good can preclude that of another. Some actors can be denied access to the good. 
International actors may provide goods through bargaining, mutual cooperation
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and punishment of cheaters. So critics explain that the appropriate model for 
international economy is that of a prisoner's dilemma or collective action 
problem^^. Snidal says that, because benefits of hegemonic regimes are not shared 
in common but are redistributed from one state to another, we can not say all 
members of the international system simultaneously benefit from the collective 
good. Hence the criterion of jointness is not met*^**. Also, because the hegemon 
most probably would have means enabling it to exclude states it wants from 
enjoyment of public goods, the second criterion is far from being met either*"*. 
Another critique asserts that free trade is not a public good since it is excludable 
and rival*"^ . But at the same time, the enforcement of trade rules is a public good 
anyway since the dependent variable according to the theory is international 
stability, not free trade or international economic openness.
Another point that scholars diverge on is the matter of motivations of the 
hegemon. One trend exemplified by the work of Kindleberger emphasizes the 
"cosmopolitan economic goals" and the "benevolence" of hegemon. Another view, 
that of Gilpin stresses the enlightened self interest and security objectives. For 
example, the United States has accepted the responsibility of becoming a hegemon 
and supporting the international system, in order to realize its own economic, 
political and ideological interests®  ^ Keohane states that there is no automatic link 
between power and leadership, the “willingness” of the hegemon to govern inter­
state relations is important*"'*.
The effect of decline of hegemony on the liberal world economy is also a 
matter of controversy. While scholars like Gilpin argue that the hegemon's decline
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weakens the prospect for the survival of the liberal trading system, there are 
scholars e.g. Keohane and Ruggie who emphasize the importance and endurance of 
international regimes of different issue areas, even after the hegemon. Contrary to 
the realist assumption that cooperation and stability are just due to dominance by 
the hegemon, the institutionalists state that " interdependence" creates interest in 
cooperation‘’^  It is shared economic interests that help creation of international 
institutions and rules, so that these are “recognized patterns of practice around 
which actors' expectations converge" and do not necessitate the presence of a 
hegemon to foster cooperative behavior among states^ *’. So, concentration of 
power in the hands of a hegemon is not the only source of order.
Keohane argues that the decline of US hegemony only partly explains the 
decline of post war international regimes. After 1970s, advanced countries have 
continued to coordinate their policies even if imperfectly. Stein insists that only one 
state, a hegemon can not alone create a liberal system, since without agreements 
and coordination of policies, a global regime is not possible. Even if the hegemon 
"imposes" a regime on weak countries, this does not create a global regime*’’. Also, 
the decline of the hegemon does not mean closure of the system and the former 
hegemon remains to be important in coordination of relations despite the lack of 
will to continue bearing costs®**. When testing the applicability of hegemonic 
stability theory, D. Snidal has used two criteria. One is the public goods 
assumption, the critique of which is given above and the other is the assumption 
that collective action is impossible without hegemony on the ground that if 
cooperation was possible then states could also provide the necessary public goods
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even in absence of hegemony^’. This second assumption is challenged by stating 
that it is in the interests of states to cooperate especially under conditions of 
increasing interdependence and anarchy need not preclude international collective 
action. Kindleberger is criticized for his pessimism that cooperation is not possible 
without hegemony.
Keohane criticizes Gilpin's systemic theory of change since it lacks an 
understanding of internal processes to explain observed effects. He believes that 
the theory contributes to our understanding, but does not explain change or why 
certain contenders emerge rather than others. For Keohane, the emphasis on 
power, interests and rationality is inadequate to explain change; the institutional 
context that states are found in should be studied™. Because hegemonic leadership 
is unlikely to be revived in this century, as no hegemon could survive after a 
nuclear war; the basic dilemma becomes how to organize cooperation without 
hegemony. This is a question that can not be neglected by just relating it to the 
presence of hegemony.
A common critique of hegemonic stability theory is its moral ( normative) 
base; whether it is morally sound for one nation - state to dominate others or 
not^V The theory deals with the problem of how world politics is changed by a 
highly asymmetric distribution of world power, in which one state dominates the 
rest. Regime theory which is an offshoot, examines the role of the hegemon in 
maintaining international institutions and takes the asymmetric distribution of 
power as given, not questioning whether this is morally acceptable or not. The 
liberal critique of hegemonic stability is that hegemony is autocratic, not
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democratic since hegemons are not elected and they can not be recalled. Also, they 
are not constrained by written constitutions’ .^ The realist explanation for the 
exclusion of a normative evaluation of international hegemony is that international 
affairs are different from domestic ones and questions of right and wrong do not 
make sense. A quotation from Kenneth Waltz exemplifies this understanding: 
"States in anarchy can not afford to be moral... The preconditions for morality are 
absent in international politics. Every state, as a consequence, has to be prepared to 
do that which is necessary for its interests as it defines them. Anarchy is the realm 
where all can, and many do, play 'dirty pool'"
The primacy of security relations and emphasis on discrepancy between 
principles and actions in the international arena leads realists to this line of 
reasoning. But liberals who base their arguments on domestic analogy ( seeing 
similarities between states interacting internationally and individuals interacting 
domestically), emphasize the importance of political morality which addresses the 
problem of justified hierarchy in the global system. So political morality is a means 
of differentiating legitimate international hegemony from illegitimate one’“*. What is 
important for liberals is the justification of hegemony that can be sustained through 
the " consent " given by other states to the hegemon since the principle of 
sovereign equality of states is to be preserved. Another point criticized and that 
has normative implications is whether hegemony helps poor countries or not. 
According to Baumgartner and Burns, asymmetrical control relationships between 
states work heavily to the advantage of dominant countries and to the disadvantage 
of weaker countries, hence explaining that the regimes are not mutually beneficial
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as suggested by the theory of hegemonic stability’®. Krasner's words; “The 
hegemon is equally likely to use its power simply to further its interests at the
expense of other states,” reflects the understanding criticized by liberals^’. A 
further challenge to the theory is that it is in fact used to rationalize American 
imperialism and domination of other countries’*. The proponents of the theory 
themselves are also aware that the hegemon can exploit its position in the name of 
nationalist ends. But Kindleberger opposes this view and adds a normative side to 
his arguments by underlining the altruistic motive of the hegemon in fulfilling its 
responsibilities. He prefers to use the term “benevolent despot” in place of 
hegemon. Kindleberger explains benevolence in terms of three phenomena;
1. Power begets greatness: The dominant powers are aware of their responsibility 
and behave in a farsighted way.
2. Power begets greatness in selected countries: Hegemony means coercion, 
motivated by narrow interests but leadership necessitates benevolence and the 
United States is a true leader.
3. Rewards gained by the hegemon are immaterial: They are prestige, glory and 
anticipated immortality. These compensate for the economic costs’ .^
Here, there is an explicit ethnocentric bias, favoring the United States and its 
dominance. This approach of the theory has been challenged, especially by less 
developed countries ( LDCs) and post communist states, reflecting the North & 
South debate and problems of underdevelopment. On the other hand, Marxists and 
neo Marxists attack hegemony when exercised by capitalist countries, though they 
had for long accepted the SU as their own system’s hegemon.*”
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The number of examples of hegemonic eras given by neorealist scholars is 
found to be threatening the validity of the theory. This number which is only two, 
even stated by some theorists to be only one ( the US era), is very limited***. Also, 
the theory is thought to overemphasize the role of the state and of political factors 
in the operation of the international market economy; undermining ideologies, 
domestic factors, social forces, technological developments and the market itself**^ . 
Still, the fact that the theory sees the rise and decline of a hegemon as an important 
determinant of "structural change " is a contribution to the understanding of the 
"dynamics" of international political economy. Russett puts forth a dimension of 
power, often neglected; the pervasive cultural influence of the United States**^ . This 
effect, what Gramscians would call cultural hegemony, has helped in creating 
common perceptions, preferences with the United States for other states in both 
economic and political spheres. The near - global acceptance of some aspects of 
American culture, like consumption, democracy and language has eased the 
rationalization of hegemony.
A methodological critique of neorealists comes from Mansfield. He 
believes that the study of distribution of power which is important for dynamics of 
political economy, when measured by counting the number of poles in the system, 
without taking power inequalities among major powers and neglecting the number 
of both polar, nonpolar major powers into consideration, leads to an incomplete 
analysis**'*. In order to overcome such limitation, "concentration" should be focused 
on, as well as the number of poles in the system. One limitation of measuring the 
distribution of power by counting the number of preponderantly powerful states, is
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the difficulty of determining which states are to be counted. The criteria for 
distinguishing polar powers from others are relative. Gilpin distinguishes three 
types of structure: hegemony, duopoly ( bipolarity) and balance of power 
(multipolarity)‘‘^  In hegemony, there is a wide power disparity between the largest 
state in the system and the others; bipolarity means the approximate equality of the 
two largest states and a wide power disparity between the smallest pole and any 
remaining state. Finally multipolarity is the approximate equality of more than two 
powerful states and a wide disparity between the smallest pole and any other state 
in the system. Mansfield states that polarity defined in this way leaves no room for 
information of the level of inequality between polar or nonpolar powers and that 
the relative size of nonpolar major powers may have strong influence on a variety 
of international outcomes*^.
Under the light of these there is reason to believe that groups of states can 
provide international public goods as well and it is wrong to ignore nonpolar major 
powers in the study of political economy. Grunberg also criticizes Gilpin for 
downplaying especially the balance of power, not recognizing that it played a large 
role in history. Bipolarity should be made compatible with hegemony at least when 
studying the post - war international political economy*’. The US hegemony can 
not be regarded truly global given the existence of the Soviet Union and its bloc at 
the same time with the capitalist order. Therefore the hegemonic stability theory 
can be evaluated as inadequate in a complete analysis of the world economy.
The theory of hegemonic stability, by linking the economic structure and its 
evolution with the international distribution of power, combines political factors
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and economic outcomes, satisfying the need for international political economics. 
After the analysis of the theory in this chapter, Chapter 3 will focus on the 
dynamics of the decline of the post - war hegemon, the United States; and the rise 
of Japan as a challenger to it, between the years 1970 - 1989, on the basis of the 
theory of hegemonic stability.
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in . DECLINE OF THE US AND THE RISE OF JAPAN ( 1970- 1989 )
A. Decline of the Post- war Hegemon: The United States
1. Early Post- war Era
After the end of the Second World War ( WWII), the United States ( US ) 
as the only preponderant power in political, military and economic terms relative to 
its war- time allies and enemies, was a candidate for leadership of regimes 
regulating relations between states. Its large market, great productive capability, 
financial facilities, strong currency and the possession of an atomic weapon were 
adequate to make the US the right candidate’. The US capabilities and willingness 
to assume this role coincided with the readiness of war- torn countries for 
cooperation with the US in order to ensure their economic rehabilitation and 
military and political security in the face of the communist threat emanating from 
the Soviet bloc countries. The challenge of this Eastern bloc acted as catalyst for 
the development of institutions for political integration and military preparation, 
like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO ), and prepared ground for 
close economic relations^.
The ability of the US to exert control over outcomes has taken place in 
positive and negative ways. Positive control of outcomes implies the acceptance 
the US has gained for values, institutions and policies carrying an American world­
view, like liberal democracy, open trade and investment\ On the other hand, 
negative control of outcomes is related with the ability of the US to prevent other
countries from implementing policies opposed to the American definition of 
national interest, like spread of communism - before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union- or a threat to American technological leadership. The former, positive 
control of outcomes can best be exemplified with the Bretton Woods system that 
sustained economic order and stability from 1944 to 1976. This liberal economic 
order led by the US was possible, owing to concentration of power in a small 
number of states giving consent to US leadership and sharing common interests 
with it. The system of the Western alliance was composed of a set of rules, 
institutions and procedures to regulate important aspects of international economic 
interaction; excluding communist states that had centrally planned economies and 
interacted in a separate international economic system under the leadership of the 
Soviet Union. The less developed countries sharing liberal values had no voice in 
the management of the system, just like Japan that remained subordinate till its 
economic recovery, supported by the American assistance''.
Created by the Bretton Woods agreement, the system relied on a limited 
conception of international economic management composed of the removal of 
barriers to trade and capital flows and the creation of a stable monetary system. 
The US hegemony led to a period of unparalleled economic growth till the 1970s, 
when a decline became apparent due to both internal and external reasons, which 
will be dwelled on in this chapter. Charles Kindleberger calls this period as the 
inner decay of the hegemon, through which it ages and slows down, exhausted of 
sustaining the public good of global stability^ The economic problems that the US
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has faced will be elaborated below, in terms of three pillars of an economic order: 
money, trade and finance®.
2. Economic Hegemony of the US
The hegemony of the United States in the economic arena, as distinguished 
from the political and military ones can be analyzed in three subfields; money, trade 
and finance; the last one being composed of international production and foreign 
aid issues. The changing status of the US with regard to each is explained under 
the light of domestic economic developments, having repercussions on the 
functioning of international regimes, 
a. Money:
Concerning the first field, international monetary management, the 
determinant was the bilateral negotiations of the US and the United Kingdom 
(UK) as the world's leading economic and political powers of the WWII era: these 
led to the creation of the Bretton Woods system in July 1944^ The Bretton Woods 
agreement provided for the establishment of the International Monetaiy Fund 
(IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, 
known as the World Bank ) ^ The former was intended to serve three functions: 
overseeing the system of pegged exchange rates ( fulfilled till 1971, when the fixed 
exchange rate system was abolished), providing financial assistance to countries 
with balance of payments problems out of a fund composed of contributions of 
member countries and trying to ease transactions in foreign exchange in order to 
foster international trade. The US has been an important contributor to the IMF,
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especially in the early post- war era and has determined the budget hence the 
leverage of the organization. The latter, World Bank, as an investment bank has 
financed specific projects such as roads, dams, agriculture, education... but in time 
its activities have expanded to broader programs of structural reform, causing its 
responsibilities to be closer to those of the IMF'^ .
IMF was created as the center of the fixed exchange rate for which 
countries would establish the parity of their currencies in terms of gold and 
maintain exchange rates within 1 percent plus or minus of parity; since the approval 
of the organization was needed for any change in exchange rates. In this way, 
currencies could be convertible making circumstances ripe for free trade. But still 
the emphasis was on national and market solutions to monetary problems and the 
IMF and IBRD were inadequate to cope with the economic problems of the war- 
torn US allies ‘®. Therefore, the US started off by 1947 to unilaterally manage the 
monetary system which necessitated a fixed relationship of the dollar to gold at 35 
dollars an ounce. Since gold production was inadequate to provide liquidity and 
determine international values of currencies ( through their fixed relationships to 
gold), the dollar assumed this role but the outflow of the currency for international 
use created a balance- of- payments problem for the American economy in time. 
Other than providing liquidity, the US became the facilitator of adjustments, 
managing the imbalances in the system by e.g. tolerating European and Japanese 
trade protectionism and discrimination for them to overcome their deficits".
In 1960, the foreign dollar holdings began to exceed US gold reserves and 
led to a great balance- of- payments deficit; the US unable to alter its exchange
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rate, experienced an overvaluation of the dollar and this exacerbated the trade 
deficit of the country. Meanwhile, other countries could alter their exchange rates 
to account for inflation. The relative economic recovery of Japan and Western 
European countries and decreasing need for Aiuerican security umbrella, in the 
face of de'tente between the US and the SU undermined the system by the end of 
thel960s'“. After the announcement of President Nixon in 1971 that the dollar 
would no longer be convertible into gold and the US would impose a 10 percent 
surcharge on dutiable imports; in December 1971, the financial ministers of 
Western countries met and agreed (Smithsonian agreement) that the world was on 
a dollar system without a link to gold and there would be no restraint on exchange 
rate fluctuations. The world economy was still dependent on the US economy for 
stability. As long as dollars were constant in demand and value, there would be no 
problem and it could function as a medium of international exchange, but the value 
did not remain constant.'^ It was in March 1973 that all major currencies were 
floating, leaving the monetary management to the market.
A major blow, exacerbating the economic decline of the US was the oil 
crisis of 1973, as the Arab oil producers increased oil prices, causing oil consumer 
countries to borrow in order to meet their energy needs. IMF, IBRD and private 
banks played an important role in recycling the oil revenues of the producers to the 
consumers in the form of loans. The US also, unable to reduce its demand for oil 
was pushed into the worst inflation, recession and balance- of- payments problems. 
The inflationary effect of this development was that high oil prices increased the 
costs of consumers and manufacturers leading to higher wages and prices in the
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economy'''. Another problem was that the Third World countries that had 
borrowed from the American banks were experiencing deficits as well and were 
not able to pay the loans back, let alone the interests'’.
The money borrowed was the OPEC surplus ( petrodollars ) and the 
careless recycling of it by the Western banking system led to the Third World debt 
problem'". Since OPEC countries wanted the payments to be done in dollars, the 
demand for the currency increased worldwide, bringing an overvaluation with it 
and the trade balance deteriorated as the dollar reached its peak in 1985.'^ Under 
these burdens, the US was trying to cope with inflation through reduction of taxes 
to restore growth, under the Ford administration, so that it could recreate 
confidence in the dollar and contribute to more stable exchange rates. Since the 
government competed with the private sector for savings to finance the fiscal 
deficit, pressure on credit markets increased the interest rates ( discouraging 
domestic investment), inducing an inflow of foreign capital. This meant increasing 
demand for dollars and pushed its price up. The currency kept on rising because 
the force driving the dollar was the movement of capital entering the country rather 
than the trade balance. Only after 1985, the currency started to fall.'"
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Figurel. Index of the Dollar’s Value Against Fifteen Industrial Country Currencies
1900 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Source: Economic Report o f the President, 19S9 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1989).
Inde.x: 1980-1982 = 100.
Source: Pool and Stanios, International Economics ( US, 1990), p. 201.
A recovery in the American economy and strengthening the dollar thus 
maintaining its international role successfully was not possible during the 
administration of President Carter, since the US could not overcome stagflation. 
This meant that the economy was in a trap of both stagnation and inflation and the 
solution considered by this administration was supply- side economics, later on 
also applied by the Reagan administration''^. In this theory, the role of relative 
prices in providing incentives for individuals to work, save and invest is 
emphasized. As one of its pioneers, Paul Craig Roberts states; " Reducing the 
marginal tax rate lets the income earner keep a larger percentage of any additions 
to income and therein lies the incentive to generate additional income or GNP." 
Thus the supply- side theorists believed that other tax reductions would lead to 
incentives for greater business investments^®. The second oil crisis, the shift of
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employment from manufacturing to service industries thus decreasing productivity 
in this sector and increasing military expenditures in the face of the Soviet invasion 
in Afghanistan - revival of the Cold War- all contributed to the fmstration 
concerning the economy.
During the Reagan administration, reduction in the money supply to 
squeeze inflation and tax cuts to eliminate recession were utilized as remedy to 
problems^’. But the inflation fighters were the low income groups and they paid 
heavily for sustaining price stability; unemployment brought social problems with 
iP . Also, tax cuts that were seen as a solution, could not stimulate the economy 
since decreasing money supply increased the interest rates, making investments less 
likely. Continuing government spending in the military sphere and the limitation of 
R& D (Research and Development) only to the military sector not extended to 
others, were far from saving the economy from recession and inflation. The 
repercussions of these on the international monetary system was the choice of 
collective leadership for management of values of major currencies^^ But this was 
possible only to a limited extent since West Germany and Japan would not accept a 
new framework as demanding as the fixed exchange rate system, closely tying their 
economies to that of the US which they believed was inflationary. Therefore the 
policy coordination was limited to bringing down interest rates and the value of the 
dollar in order to stimulate the American economy and help it get rid of the budget 
and trade defıcits^^
At the Plaza meeting of September 1985, the Group of Five finance 
ministers stated that direct governmental intervention was required for stability in
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the monetary system^^ According to the Plaza accord, signed by the US and Japan 
and announced to G- 5 countries, the orderly appreciation of the main non- dollar 
currencies vis- a- vis the dollar was agreed on. The currency fell till the American 
authorities intervened to stop it^ *^. The accord did not work due to three reasons; 
first of all, the devaluation of the dollar did not change the fact that the US was a 
safe haven for foreign direct investment, second, the dollar fell against the yen and 
the mark, not the other currencies such as those of Canada, Mexico, and the last 
reason was that strong import demand in the US continued, believing that higher 
quality was coming from abroad hence the trade deficit did not improve. Further 
depreciation of the dollar could even cause foreign direct investment pull- out, 
dragging the economy into recession concerning investments.^’
The Tokyo Summit of the G- 7, in May 1986 (US, Britain, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy and Japan) where the main issues were the US trade deficit and the 
huge Third World debt and then the Baker- Miyazawa accord on the dollar- yen 
rate in October 1986 were the platforms for further negotiations. During the 
Louvre Summit of February 1987, it was stated that the currencies should be 
stabilized within fairly narrow ranges around the rates that existed at the time of 
speaking; but the necessary policy changes did not come. Also, Japanese and 
German efforts to eliminate US deficits through overvaluation of their currencies 
and stimulating their domestic demand, could not be successful since their growth 
rates were inadequate and they found the effort inflationary-l The Venice Summit 
of June 1987 was a continuation of band- aid trial- and - error muddle- along 
efforts’'’. The Bank of Japan and Bundesbank bought dollars to prevent the dollar
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from collapsing. With the end of this triple intervention to the market to stabilize 
the dollar, the currency fell in October 1987 and there really was a mess when 
President George Bush came to power. In 1988, imports were at an alarming rate- 
nearly 460 billion dollars in 1988 alone; an increase in exports to 322 billion 
dollars helped narrow the trade gap but the side effect of devaluation which is 
inflation had become a serious concern. Therefore the understanding that there was 
need for protectionist measures became widespread.’® Large deficits continued and 
were exacerbated by the Gulf War. The economic boom to revive the American 
economy did not come. Thus, there was only limited cooperation in the framework 
of the floating exchange rates and given the problems that the dollar faced and the 
unwillingness of other countries such as Germany or Japan to take burden of 
managing the monetary system, there was no candidate to assume the role of the 
US, by the end of the 1980s.
b.Trade
As the dominant military and economic power in the post- war era, the US 
fostered an open trading system in order to sustain global economic growth and 
cooperation, knowing that political stability required economic prosperity. Free 
trade, as part of a liberal economic order would necessitate a multilateral 
approach in order to ensure support and participation. This aim was realized 
through the extension of the bilateral tariff reduction negotiations of the US with 
third parties to the international forum. In this way, tariff reductions would be
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applied not only to negotiating parties but to other trading partners as well, on a 
most- favored- nation basis. Under the US leadership, an international conference 
was convened in 1947, in Geneva and general trading guidelines were drawn in 
the form of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)^'. The basic 
principle, the principle of non- discrimination was clearly reflected to the most- 
favored- nation principle, according to which:
" any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting 
party, to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall 
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating 
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties."
Another important rule of the regime has been the prohibition of the use of 
quantitative restrictions like quotas, except for balance- of- payments reasons. But 
GATT also had escape clauses such as preferential systems, customs unions and 
free trade associations that were detrimental to a totally open economic order. 
GATT in time became institutionalized and turned into an international 
organization with a secretariat and an institutional forum within which trade 
negotiations would take place, headed by the US. American leadership has been 
important for the promotion of trade liberalization since the US encouraged 
Europe and Japan for free trade through its aid programmes and permitted 
discrimination even against itself, keeping its market open for European and 
Japanese goods despite their protectionist policies” . Under these circumstances, 
trade expanded rapidly as long as the US could carry the burden. Meanwhile, the 
Western European countries were getting together under common policies in the 
European Economic Community ( EEC ) and Japan was recovering economically.
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The customs union of the EEC meant discrimination and the Common Agricultural 
Policy of the community especially was opposed to the American interests.
Japan which was carrying out a policy of protective economic nationalism, 
by maintaining an undervalued yen, was encouraging exports and restraining 
imports in order to reach a balance- of- trade surplus "^'. Between 1960 and 1970, 
world trade growth accelerated, the physical volume of manufactured- goods trade 
expanded 2.7 times. But the increasing competitiveness of the allies and the 
overvaluation of the dollar under the fixed exchange rate began to be detrimental 
to the US economy, causing its exports to be expensive in the world markets, 
creating in time a trade deficit since the US was open to the exports of the allies 
though it had difficulty in selling abroad. The last year the US trade balance 
recorded a surplus was in 1970^  ^ In 1971, the Nixon administration brought new 
measures to increase productivity and control imports by a 10 percent surcharge on 
dutiable ones and the dollar was twice officially devalued, as a remedy for the trade 
deficit®.
The end of the Bretton Woods system, as the currencies began to float 
freely in 1973 was problematic for the future of free trade, decreasing chances of 
predictability and stability. The US administrations, trying to cope with inflation 
and recession during the 1970s, drew close to protective measures and during the 
GATT negotiations in Tokyo in 1973, retreat from liberalism and rise of new 
protectionism were apparent^’. Since tariffs were dealt with and bound by GATT, 
more hidden forms of protection were utilized. For example, governments began to 
use voluntary export restraints, orderly market arrangements... in a way organizing
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trade which ought to be free, through bilateral means^^ In the US, tariffs have 
declined steadily from 1914 to 1986. They decreased from 59 percent in 1932 to 7 
percent after implementation of the Kennedy Round tariff cuts by the early 1970s·’’. 
But in the face of the global economic problems of the 1970s, continuing through 
the 80s, non- tariff restrictions have been utilized in international trade. These 
barriers have existed before as well, but their significance increased with the 
decrease or total elimination of tariff barriers through successful GATT 
negotiations.
Used in higher- technology sectors and difficult to be identified; non- tariff 
barriers carried an increasing percentage of world trade outside the GATT, which 
left countries free to use NTBs according to their domestic political economic 
interests'*®. According to an OECD report, "within the protected sectors, the scope 
of protection has both deepened and widened, with the absolute number of non­
tariff barriers quadrupling between 1968 and 1 9 8 3 " Trade increasingly became a 
network of bilateral and regional relationships as outcome of nationalistic 
approaches owing to the two oil crises causing dramatic rise in the price of oil and 
pushing the world economy into recession, monetary instability ( floating exchange 
rates) and increasing interdependence. Protectionism became a means of improving 
payments imbalances for countries'”. Meanwhile; placing the blame for the decline 
in US competitiveness, on unfair foreign actions and protectionism has led the US 
managers and workers to underemphasize that the reason could be lack of 
efficiency on their part. Also government officials have stated that the US was still
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supporting rules of the liberal international regime and this has become the 
justification for greater use of trade- distorting measures by the US''^
The US was hardly the driving force behind trade management as faced with 
domestic economic dilemmas. The problem was that the means to strengthen the 
economy were mutually exclusive. The appreciation of the dollar in the first half of 
thel980s while easing inflation, further exacerbated the trade deficit problem, also 
causing recession with regard to increasing interest rates. By 1984, the deficit had 
exceeded 100 billion dollars for the first time in American history; as the volume of 
exports remained unchanged despite the increasing volume of imports.
Table 1. US Merchandise Exports by End-Use Category, 1965-1988
(billions of $ U.S.)
Total Agricultural
Products
Industrial
Products
Capital
Goods
Automotive
h\xports
Other
Exports
1965 26.5 6.3 7.6 8.1 1.9 2.6
1970 42.5 7.4 12.3 14.7 3.9 4.3
1975 107.1 22.2 26.7 36.6 10.8 10.7
1980 224.3 42.2 64.9 74.2 17.5 25.4
1985 214.3 38.9 53.6 75.6 24.8 37.1
1986 21 7 2 36.5 57.3 75.8 21.7 35.9
1987 254.1 42.0 66.7 86.2 24.6 34.6
1988 322.4 55.4 85.1 109.2 29.3 43.4
Source: Economic IndicatorSy Aug. 1989; Council of Economic Advisors, U.S. Governmenr 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1989.
Note: Military shipments are excluded.
Source: Pool and Stainos, p. 53.
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Tabic 2. US Merchandise Imports by End-Use Catcgoiy, 1965-1988.
(billions of $ U.S.)
Total Petroleum
Products
Industrial
Products
Capital
Goods
Automotii/e
Imports
Other
Imports
1965 21.5 2.0 9.1 1.5 0.9 8.0
1970 39.9 2.9 12.3 4.0 5.7 15.0
1975 98.2 27.0 23.6 10.2 12.1 25.3
1980 244.8 79.3 54.0 31.2 27.9 57.4
1985 328.7 48.8 62.7 61.4 62.2 93.4
1986 368.5 34.4 69.9 72.1 78.1 114.0
1987 406.2 42.9 71.2 84.8 85.2 125.8
1988 441.0 40.0 81.0 101.4 87.7 130.9
Source: Economic Indicators, Aug. 1989; Council of Economic Advisors, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1989.
Source:. Pool and Stanios, p. 53.
Tax cuts of the Reagan era tempted the Americans to consume more and 
spend their incomes on imports rather than saving, which was the real aim of the 
administration.
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Figure 2. US Private Consumption, Private Saving and Government Dissaving, 1979-1987.
% of GNP
% of GNP
Source:. W. R. Cline, US External Adjustment and the World Economy ( Washington, 1989), p. 
55.
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In the end, the currency markets would have to acknowledge the situation and 
dump the dollar'’“'. This was possible only through cooperation with Japan and 
Western Germany, concluding the Plaza and Louvre accords in order to first 
depreciate the dollar and then save it from collapse. Experiencing twin deficits, 
the US was also dealing with a budget deficit, increasing due to continuing 
government (military) expenditures and began borrowing from abroad, especially 
from Japan which in time increased the Japanese assets in the US. What is more is 
that, when in 1987 Germans and the Japanese did not tolerate a rise in the 
American interest rates and responded by raising interest rates, the stock market 
crashed ( October 19, 1987)''^
The trade deficit has shown itself in two ways: the first one was related with 
the products in which the US has lost competitiveness (cameras, television sets... 
almost all produced in other countries) hence imported from abroad and the second 
one was comprised of intermediate products produced abroad by US firms and 
then imported to the US, exacerbating the trade deficit crisis. This second trend has 
been called outsourcing or export platforming and has become a major part of 
American manufacture'"’. A veiy pessimistic picture may be drawn but all these 
show that the American economy was not able to assume its post- war role of 
liberalizing world trade through unilateral gestures and had to solve its domestic 
problems in cooperation with industrialized countries. This paved the way for trade 
to take place outside the GATT framework, regulated by ad hoc bilateral 
agreements'”.
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C.Finance
Concerning international finance, the US hegemony has shown itself in the 
form of lending and making investments abroad, acting as the primary source of 
capital for developing countries and the lender of last resort, in the form of lending 
money and providing an open market for goods produced in other countries till 
1985'“*. Also it was the pioneer of foreign direct investment in different countries 
later on followed by the European and Japanese corporations''®. In this section the 
American use of aid and foreign direct investment in the post- war era and the 
reasons leading to less effective use of these means by the US will be stated.
I. Foreign aid
During the era of American - led finance ( 1947- 1985), official foreign aid 
has become an important form of capital flow, beginning with the Marshall Plan 
with the aim of strengthening liberal economies vis- a'- vis the Soviet threat. The 
objectives of the aid programmes have been the restoration and reconstruction of 
war ravaged countries, helping underdeveloped areas to prosper and strengthening 
the defenses of the free (liberal) world^°. In addition, international organizations 
(such as the World Bank, regional development banks and tlie IMF) have been 
established under American leadership, in order to channel capital to developed 
and less developed countries*'. The US has been the largest contributor to these 
agencies but its share has declined in time, in the face of its domestic economic 
problems. In the early post- war era, American aid policy was influenced by the 
Cold War, making it a priority to support allies and gain new friends in the Third-
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World . The US also urged Europe and Japan for contribution and supported the 
creation of a Development Assistance Committee within the OECD, to deal with 
aid policies^ .^ During thel950s and the 1960s, the US supported different 
initiatives in international organizations to increase the flow of aid to South but this 
did not prevent the widening gap or meet the Northern expectations of democracy 
or political stability^ ;^ since Third World saw aid as a tool, creating dependence. 
After the Vietnam war, many in the US began to see economic aid as a means 
involving the country in the internal affairs of recipients; also influenced by 
increasing domestic economic problems such as inflation, recession; opposition to 
aid programmes became apparent '^'. US foreign aid decreased from 3.5 billion 
dollars in 1967 to 3.0 billion dollars in 1973, meanwhile aids became tied in the 
sense that recipients had to purchase goods from donors’’. Concerning foreign aid 
in terms of goods and services; some industries producing items for foreign aid 
have utilized products and services in other industries to make their finished goods, 
making extra expenditures. On the other hand, foreign aid has helped to increase 
the flow of necessary commodities and raw materials to the US and increase 
demand for American goods abroad” .
In the 1970s and the 1980s, channels like trade relations, foreign direct 
investment and private bank loans rather than official foreign aid gained importance 
in the relations between North and South’^  At the time of the first oil crisis (1973- 
4), as the dollar was the strongest currency, the dollar rich OPEC nations wanted 
to cycle their oil revenues into American and European banks. The banks faced a ' 
dilemma, they had billions of dollar deposits but in the face of the recession ( that
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was due to high oil prices) they could not put them to work and had to lend with 
high interest rates to be able to pay interest to OPEC nations^ **. The capital poor 
Third World states borrowing money, had to pay high interests and the seeds of the 
Third World debt crisis were planted.The problem was exacerbated by the end of 
the 1970s, the second oil crisis hit the southern economies more than any. 
Increasing oil prices decreased the demand for the exports of these countries and 
increased their importation expenditures; between 1979- 1981 the money owed to 
the banks was more than 200 million dollars^ '·'.
Figure 3. OPEC Petrodollar Recycling
oil
Source: Pool and Stamos, p. 143.
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In the first half of the 80s, the official US government policy (Baker Plan) 
was that both private bank and governmental loans should be continued if debtor 
countries could restructure their economies, under IMF- approved austerity plans; 
this decreased the amount of loan flowing to South“ . Another development 
concerning the crisis was the plan of the Treasuiy Secretary Brady in 1989 that 
called on US commercial banks to reduce lending and on international financial 
institutions (IMF, WB) to support the process by changes in their lending 
policies®'. This plan also stressed a case- by- case basis in handling the debt 
problem and called for reforms under IMF and WB, but diverged from the Baker 
plan with its emphasis on debt reduction® .^ Meanwhile there were "domestic" 
problems to be dealt with and American banks began to give domestic loans®^  
Consumers and the government borrowed in order to consume more; also 
companies borrowed not to buy capital equipment to increase their competitiveness 
but to buy one another. This did not develop productivity but increased borrowing 
in the domestic realm.®®
Concerning official foreign aid, under Reagan administration through the 
1980s, cuts in nondefense components of the US budget led to shift of emphasis 
from development assistance to military one®®. The Cold War was once again 
providing the main rationale for US foreign assistance. Other than the frustration 
with foreign policy results of economic aid, the US and other Western countries 
have lost confidence in their capacity to determine development paths of poor..
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States. Multilateral aid has grown more rapidly than bilateral aid programmes, 
comprising one fourth of all Western economic assistance“ . Other than domestic 
economic problems of the US preventing large amounts of official aid, the 
experience of the Third World debt crisis prepared ground for more multilateral 
aid. After being analyzed here as a lender, the "debtor" characteristic of the US 
should be emphasized as well. The US did not become a debtor because it went to 
Japan and Western Europe and asked for money; but the fact is that by 1983, the 
capital flow into the US began to exceed the flow of US capital investments to the 
rest of the world®’. In five years' time, the world's largest creditor nation became 
the world's largest debtor nation. By 1986, Japan became the world's largest 
creditor nation®^
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Figure 4. US Net External Assets, 1970-1989.
$ billions
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Vol. 68, 
No. 6, June 1988.
Source; Pool and Stamos, p. 176.
The necessity to finance the US budget and trade deficits with foreign 
capital (selling domestic assets abroad) and the acquisition of billions of dollars by 
foreign central banks to support the dollar have created a US dependence on other 
governments'^^ The foreign investment financing the deficits, in 1985 changed from 
portfolio investment to direct investment in US property and businesses (especially 
by Japan and European countries; Germany, Switzerland, France and Italy)’". This 
made it difficult for the US to catch up in the face of its trading structure based on
53
importation. Japanese economy while funding American government deficit 
became so tied with the US economy that this integration was called as the 
Nichibei economy and was evaluated to mask the American decline” . The external 
debt of the US, mostly privately held made the country a "safe haven" for foreign 
investments. Increased interest rates to cut inflation, US need for external savings 
to finance American domestic national debt and Japanese German surpluses, led to 
increasing foreign direct investments in the US.
International production through MNCs composes the second branch of 
international finance and has become by the end of the 80s , a vulnerability for the 
US economy according to many scholars. But there are also ones believing that 
foreign owned companies have made the US economy more competitive” , 
ii. International Production (MNCs)
" MNCs are those economic enterprises- manufacturing, extractive, service 
and financial - that are headquartered in one country and that pursue business 
activities in one or more foreign countries"” . In the early post- war era, especially 
the 60s American corporations dominated the scene and profited from operations 
abroad in Europe, Japan and Latin America” . After the mid- 70s, European and 
Japanese corporations, even those of newly industrializing countries such as Brazil, 
India and South Korea have surpassed the US. At the basis of the operation of 
MNCs, there is product cycle theory according to which, a corporation of an 
advanced economy first of all experiences monopoly in its own country due to 
technology, then as a result of growing foreign demand, diftlision of technology 
and rising trade barriers, it becomes profitable to produce the commodity in
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another advanced country"". In the end, production is also shifted to less developed 
countries where comparative advantage becomes lower wage rates there. The 
intra- firm trade has become an important part of global trade. Till European and 
Japanese multinationals narrowed the technology gap with the US, American 
corporations placed important proportion of their assets abroad and gained large 
amounts"". The total book value of all direct foreign investment has increased from 
158 billion dollars in 1971 to 546 billion dollars in 1981. In 1976, 47.6 percent of 
all foreign direct investment belonged to the US, 35.9 percent to Europeans and 
6.7 percent to Japanese, but the predominance of the US declined with increase in 
the corporations of the latter ones"*.
Tabic 3. Trends in the Direct Investment Abroad of Selected Countries, Selected Years, 1971- 
1981.
PARENT COUNTRY 1971 1976 1981
United States 52.3% 47.6% 41.4%
United Kingdom 15.0 11.2 11.9
Germany 4.6 6.9 8.3
Japan 2.8 6.7 6.7
Canada 4.1 3.9 4.7
Source: United Nations, Economic and Social Council. Commission on Transnational Corpora­
tions, Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-examination, E/C. 10/38 (New 
York: United Nations. March 1978), p. 236. and U.S. Department of Commerce. International 
Trade Administration, International Direct Investment, (Washington, August 1984), p. 7.
Source:. D. H. Blake and R. S. Walters, The Politics of Global Economic Relations. ( New Jersey, 
1987), p. 92.
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In the 1980s, the US became world's largest host for MNCs as well as 
being a source of foreign direct investment’®. This led to anxieties that foreigners 
especially the Japanese were buying up America“®. Gaining market shares abroad 
became synonymous with being competitive globally, maximizing long run returns 
and sustaining protection against protectionism. This trend was fostered with 
Reaganomics which caused interest rates to rise through increasing military 
expenditures and cuts in taxes and encouraged foreign investors to first, buying 
securities, especially government debt, than to purchase of American assets that 
became very cheap for foreigners after the devaluation of the dollar, in the second 
half of the 80s“'. Other than the nationalistic thinking that this was "fire sale" of 
America and autonomy began to be lost“’, a more optimistic view suggested that 
there were certain benefits of foreign direct investment for America“’. This was 
regarded as a sign of the increasing internationalization of the economy, 
strengthening the US firms and making them more competitive since investments 
meant new jobs, innovation and productivity. Through sustaining US investment in 
the face of low US national saving rate, foreign direct investment contributed to 
economic growth. In addition the trend was not unique to the US; worldwide joint 
ventures, technology and production sharing arrangements and other alliances were 
proof of this“^  Still caution was widespread vis- a'- vis foreign direct investment, 
especially towards Japanese investments, thinking that this exacerbated American 
deindustrialization.
The laissez faire approach of the US caused it to make joint ventures with 
Japan, transporting research findings, manufacturing experience there, but facing
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limited local control and no technology transfer on the side of Japanese 
corporations’*^  Also people were thinking that US investment abroad exported 
jobs, decreased exportation and fostered "deindustrialization". The fear was that 
American economy would become just an assembler of components manufactured 
abroad by US multinationals***. Therefore, international production has become a 
sensitive political issue, on the American agenda. Meanwhile the role of MNCs in 
the development of the Third World has become a hotly debated issue, there are 
two opposite views; the former seeing corporations as engines of growth and the 
latter as agents of imperialism (dependency school)*”. The US also continues 
foreign direct investment as a host countiy, but beginning with the 80s, control of 
home country has become limited and difficult in the face of a great variety of 
negotiated arrangements, different from the times of early multinationalism. US 
share of GDP (Gross Domestic Produce) has fallen from 27 percent in 1950 to 18 
percent in 1984*  ^ A relative decline in the ability of the US to lead international 
finance is apparent in both foreign aid and international production components of 
the field, especially in the light of the rise of other powers. The US has turned 
inward economically to deal with its domestic economic problems and is less active 
when compared with the economic hegemon of the early post- war era.
3. Hegemonic Decline
Paul Kennedy's argument in his book " The Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers" that the US like its predecessors has overextended on all fronts and 
gradually slipped into second- rate status, having to share power with emerging 
power blocs in Europe and the Pacific, has been a popular one*'*'. When analyzed
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with regard to different subfields, the relative economic decline and problems faced 
are easily seen. The economic rise of the hegemon in the 1950s and the 60s and 
development of world economy under American leadership has been stagnated in 
the 70s and further in the 80s, with the changing internal and external 
circumstances. Among the former; increasing consumption though through 
borrowing, importing exceeding exports and decreasing productivity can be 
counted'^ ®. Twin deficits, those of fiscal and trade, are among reasons of hegemonic 
decline which Kindleberger calls as " inner decay " due to heavy burdens of 
sustaining leadership and the free rider problem” . The loss of technological 
leadership and increasing interdependence''^ with the rest of the world, have 
weakened American economy and the US began importing innovative technologies 
from Germany and Japan in order to remain competitive in high- volume products 
through utilization of used off- shore production. R&D expenditures have been 
made in the military sphere especially during the 80s''^ According to Gilpin, the 
relative loss of US shares in exports of manufactures and high tech products has 
been an evidence of decline in its hegemonic character.
With regard to changing external circumstances, the increasing 
competitiveness of Western Europe and Japan can be stated; increasing their 
prosperity under the US leadership, later on cooperating with the declining 
hegemon to mask its fall. The global economic recession of the 1970s, oil crises 
and the Third World debt problem have affected American economy, perhaps more 
than any other economy, given its pivotal role and centrality of its currency in the
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financial relations. According to the declinists, the evidences of the American 
decline are the following;
" - mounting US trade and fiscal deficits
- continuing and even accelerating declines in US shares of global 
economic power and in US rates of growth in key areas of economic 
performance
Table 4. Average Annual Growth Rates of Real GNP
1961-1965
U n i t e d
S t a t e s
4.6
J a p a n
12.4
E u r o p e a n
C o m m u n i t y
4.9
1966-1970 3.0 1 1.0 4.6
1971-1975 2.2 4.3 2.9
1976-1980 3.4 5.0 3.0
1981-1985 2.6 4.0 1.5
1986-1987 2.9 3.1 2.5
1983-1987 3.8 3.8 2.3
VH'MC».; AnniMi Kr|M>n o f the (!4Miiuil o f hUonomic Advi\rr<, m E fu n o m ir  ¡ (»p u rt o f  tk * /•r/o<//rii. \V.t%hmgtoo; U..S 
(H iyrrMninii I'r iiiiitiK  O llh r , IllHH, on Tahir lUI I l,|>. .171.
Source: S. P. Huntington. " US Decline or Renewal?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 67, no. 2 ( Winter 
1988-9) p. 83.
sustained systemic weaknesses like R&D, education, savings, investment patterns.
production of scientists ( domestic mismanagement )■^i., u 9.·;
Declinists believe that external expansion rather than internal stagnation is 
the main reason for decline’  ^Different scholars diverge on the priority of internal
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and external reasons for the decline of the American economy, which is a 
subjective and relative concept changing up to the beholder. Anti- declinists are 
optimistic about the US leadership and public willingness to reverse downward 
trends in the domestic economy'·'’. This thesis accepts that by the end of the 80s, a 
relative decline was apparent.
B. Rise of Japan
1. Postwar Reconstruction and Roots of Economic Growth ( 1945- 1969 )
Defeated and devastated in the WW2, Japan experienced a period of 
reconstruction, rehabilitation aided by the US, preparing the ground for the 
country's economic development. War brought Japan to the verge of starvation and 
challenged its political and economic existence. Japan was regarded as an 
underdeveloped country and only under the American protection, it was possible 
for it to establish economic, political, social and educational systems''*. Japan, 
identifying itself with the West, had the national slogan of " catching up with the 
West" since economic prosperity was a means to be accepted by the Western 
community'·'''.
During the years of occupation (1945- 52), under the authority of Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General MacArthur; efforts were in the 
direction of turning Japan into a peaceful democracy. Article 9 of the new 
constitution stated that the Japanese people would forever renounce war as a
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sovereign right of the nation, forbidding them to have any armed forces'“ . As in 
1949 the Liberals came to power, a big reform began in order to revitalize the 
prewar companies, with the aim of ensuring economic recovery. Though the 
American occupation was formally ended in 1952, US troops remained in Japan, in 
the framework of the Security Treaty signed. In this era, trade agreements and 
provision of equipment by the US have been important for a boost to the economy. 
The fact that the US needed an ally in the North Pacific vis- a- vis the communist 
threat was effective and especially during the Korean war, America spent huge 
sums of money for Japan"".
In 1949, Japan adopted a unitary exchange rate of 360 yen per dollar, 
preparing the basis for its admission to the IMF in 1952 and to the GATT in 
1955'“ . During the 1950s, leaders of Japanese enterprises did not pay for R&D, 
but imported new techniques to be used in production as a mean to industrial 
recovery'“ . Together with strong government support and protection to growing 
industries'“ , and gaining more than any other country from the pattern of free trade 
in the framework of GATT and IMF; Japan embarked on an era of economic 
growth fuelled with the famous National Income Doubling Plan of 1960 and in 
1964 it brought down the share of its industries under import protection to 7 
percent, meeting a basic criterion for participation in the world economic system. 
In 1964, Japan became an IMF section eight country which showed its new status 
as an economic power among world's free market nations'“ . In the 1960s, whole 
world experienced prosperity but especially in Japan income was tripled'“ . With an 
eye to these early developments, in the second part of Chapter 3, the rise of the
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Japanese economy is dwelled on, with regard to two pillars of its economy; trade 
and finance, the latter involving investment and aid relations of the country. The 
reasons underlying the Japanese success and peculiarities of Japanese trade and 
finance are analyzed.
2. Trade
When Japan became a party to GATT in 1955; the international 
institutional framework governing trade and investment relations of the non­
communist bloc in the postwar era, it began to benefit from the public good of 
more open access to foreign markets, without making the contribution of opening 
its own market. This attitude of Japan was tolerated by the US in the 1950s, but 
since the 60s, Japan has been under pressure of its trading partners to reduce its 
trade barriers Therefore Japan has not been part of two- way flows of 
manufactured goods, seen in the trade of most other industrial nations; as a late 
comer determined to catch up, it has had little interest in promotion of free trade, 
on the contrary has been motivated to justify protectionism. With this rationale, 
Japan has at the beginning put a reservation to Article 12 of GATT, allowing it to 
continue its extensive system of quota controls on imports, but at the same time 
continuing government supported export and investment promotion programs, 
leading to a surplus by the end of the 1960s'®**.
Japan began liberalizing its trade barriers in the early 1960s but not because 
of a belief that liberalization would bring benefits to the Japanese economy, just 
due to foreign pressure and fear of utilization of retaliatory protectionist policies by 
other countries. Also the maturation of Japanese industrial structure and financial
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markets has been effective’”’. The main understanding in the Japanese business 
circles has been that the country should export manufactured goods in order to pay 
for raw material imports, given the fact that Japan has experienced serious raw 
material scarcity problem and has had to import these from abroad. In this way, a 
new term was born "processing nation", characterizing Japan which does not have 
raw materials itself but prospers by importing raw materials, adding value to them 
and then exporting the manufactured products in order to pay for the original raw 
materials””.
Import- substitution policies are an important part of industrialization 
efforts, but the general Japanese bias toward imports, in nearly all sectors of 
society (academic, government, business) has been a too long, wrong and one­
sided application of the comparative advantage theory to manufacturing, 
overemphasizing the disadvantage in natural resources’” . Therefore, there is also 
no ground for intra- industry trade which means imports and exports of similar 
products, creating a highly criticized aspect of the Japanese trade since intra­
industry trade among developed nations has increased especially in the 1980s”^
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Table 5. Intraindustry Trade in Major Countries.
Intraindustry Trade Index (1989) Estimation by Lincoln (1985)
All Products Manufactured
Products
All Products Manufactured
Products
u .s. 0.55 0.64 0.54 0.61
Japan 0,28 0.49 0.23 0.26
EC 0.85 0.91 — —
non-EC 0.64 0.76 — —
Germany 0.78 0.65 0.63 0.67
France 0.73 0.81 0.74 0.82
Source: MITI, Annual Survey on Trade in 1990, Lincoln (1990).
Note: * Trade imbalance effect is adjusted with respect to manufactured products.
Source. Y. Funabashi, Japan's International Agenda. ( New York, 1994 ), p. 115.
Intra- industry trade increases product variety, creating a wider consumer 
choice also reduces adjustment costs of opening an economy to foreign trade since 
industries can remain intact, while specializing in narrower product" ranges. 
Japanese exports have been concentrated in industries with low intra- industry 
trade levels, reflecting a different trade pattern from that of other industrialized 
nations though Japan has also become an advanced industry, since the mid 1970s. 
According to Lincoln, a reason for this, other than the bias towards importation 
can be that an important proportion of Japanese trade has taken place with 
developing Asian nations that are not at a level adequate to carry out intra-
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industry trade with Japan. But this is the Japanese pattern when trading with the 
US and European countries as well"l As a result of this policy, Japan reached a 
huge trade surplus ( that rose from about 35 billion dollars in 1983 to over 53 
billion dollars in 1985 ) making the country a financial power“'’, leading it to 
making investments abroad especially in the US, and increasing its budget for 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) mainly to Asian countries.
Table 6. Manufactured Imports as Percentages of GDP.
Country 1970 1980 Percentage Increase
Japan 2.41 2.87 19
U.K. 10.16 16.03 57
Italy 7.96 12.70 59
France 9.23 13.09 42
Germany 10.41 15.03 44
U.S. 3.48 5.73 64
Canada 16.40 20.20 23
Source: Derived from figures in World Bank. World Tables, 3d ed., Comparative Economic 
Data. Table 6 and country pages. Economic Data Sheet I. using current prices.
Source: A. Iriye and W. I. Cohen, The United Slates and Jauaiu ( Kentucky, 1989), p. 131.
Japan's trade policy has been a reaction against restrictive measures of its 
trading partners and their pressures to liberalize access to its market and has 
become a proponent o f " managed trade". Tyson and Zysman (1989) have named 
the Japanese trade policy as " moving band of protectionism " implying the 
liberalization of trade only after overinvestment in a protected domestic market.
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together with concentrated exports abroad. Thus liberalization has taken place 
slowly, gradually after catching up with the level of Western technology' 
According to the theory of hegemonic stability, Japan has pursued a policy of 
myopic self- interest in trade''", benefiting from the public good of free trade as a 
"free rider ", and pursuing protectionist policies. Theorists of this school believe 
that Japan pursued this policy in the early postwar era because it was small enough 
to act as a free rider and will continue to do so because it has not become large 
enough to stabilize the system alone, in the face of declining American 
hegemony"’.
3. Finance
After the WW2, during the occupation years American authorities started 
the moves for the liberalization of the Japanese finance and the efforts were 
continued by the Japanese government through the 1950s. It was in the 1960s, 
when Japanese banks were allowed to operate abroad and the international use of 
the yen and sale of Japanese equities began. In 1964, Japan accepted the IMF 
obligation to maintain convertibility on current account transactions and in the late 
60s, emerged as a creditor for the first time which meant that the assets held 
abroad by Japanese nationals and corporations far exceeded the assets -held in 
Japan by foreign nationals and corporations"". During the first half of the 1970s, 
Japanese authorities imposed controls on the capital outflows and liberalized 
inflows in order to deal with the government deficit but in the latter half, outflow 
was encouraged in the face of increasing surplus. By the 1980s, internationalization 
has accelerated and Tokyo became the third leg of a globally integrated financial
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system, after New York and London. The internationalization of Japanese financial 
institutions has brought further push for liberalization and outward looking 
policies'
a. Foreign Direct Investment ( FDI)
Direct investment is any investment in a foreign corporation in which the 
fixed ratio of 10 percent or more of its stock is acquired. The Japanese foreign 
direct investment began in the early 1950s, but was quite small in amount (around 
200 million dollars or 300 million dollars) till the 1970s and the areas and types of 
industries invested in were limited; mainly in developing countries and related to 
resource acquisition'^“.
Table 7. Japan’s Foreign Direct Investment by Region, 1951-1988.
North America (United States) Asia
(Asian Newiy 
industrializing 
Economies)
(Association of 
Southeast 
Asian Nations) Europe Middle East Oceania Other Areas
1951-60 31.1 (30.7) 17.3 (4.6) (9.2) 1.1 19.8 0.7 30.0
1961-70 25.0 (18.6) 21.3 (5.0) (13.1) 19.3 8.4 7.6 17.4
1971-75 24.3 (22.0) 28.1 (10.2) (17.6) 15.2 5.2 5.3 21.9
1976-60 28.6 (26.6) 27.3 (10.2) (16.8) 9.5 6.2 7.8 20.6
1981-85 36.4 (34.8) 20.4 (8.7) (10.8) 13.9 1.5 3.6 24.2
(1951-85) 32.2 (30.2) 23.3 (9.1) (13.4) 13.2 3.6 5.1 22.7
1986-88 46.9 (45.3) 12.4 (7.2) (3.5) 18.7 0 .4 “ 4.9 16.7
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, Taigai chyokusetsu-toshi no kyoka todokede zisseki.
Source: R. Komiya and R. Wakasugi. " Japan's Foreign Direct Investment," Annals, no. 513 ( 
Jan. 1991), p. 52.
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Figure 5. Japan’s Foreign Direct Investment, 1960-1988.
B i 1 Ii  on 
U·S· Do 11 a r
[Statistics of approval/notification of overseas direct investment], various years.
Source;. Komiya and Wakasugi, p. 50.
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The first phase of the Japanese foreign direct investment of the 1960s and 
the!970s was export oriented, aiming development of natural resources in 
developing countries, manufacturing low- tech products in LDCs - less developed 
countries- (Asia and Latin America) and investing in developed states (the US and 
Europe) in areas of commerce, banking and services'^'. The main aim of the 
Japanese direct investment of the era was exploiting natural resources, low wages 
in Asian countries and preparing ground for Japanese exports to these regions'^^. 
Also, Japan was transfering low technology to LDCs in the face of growth of 
internal capacity of its firms. After the rapid economic growth of the 1960s and the 
70s, since Japan reached a huge trade surplus, Japanese foreign direct investment 
accelerated and the Japanese economy began to change from a trade oriented 
economy into a foreign investment oriented one.
At the beginning of the 70s, affected by the global recession and inflation 
exacerbated by the oil crisis, the Japanese growth rate fell and the surplus was 
absorbed by growing government deficits. But as soon as the deficits were 
eliminated in the late 70s by increasing taxes and decreasing government spending, 
Japanese investors began to look abroad for good investment opportunities'^^ 
Therefore the Japanese foreign direct investment that accelerated in the early 70s 
(exceeding 2 billion dollars in 1972 which was called as the very first year of direct 
investment) though stagnated between the two oil crises; remained at an annual 
rate of 3- 4 billion dollars and continued with a changing nature in the 1980s’^ ^
This qualitative and quantitative change was that Japan began to make 
investments in developed countries in North America and Western Europe, and in
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technology based industries, though concentrated before in developing nations. In 
this way the Japanese foreign direct investment converged toward the Western 
style. Especially the US which needed inflow of capital from abroad due to the fact 
that imports were exceeding exports, became a market, where Japan got rid of its 
surplus'^’. This was also how the US became a debtor nation. Meanwhile, the 
structural power of Japan in the financial system grew due to size and importance 
of Japanese financial institutions and Japan's authority over them. By 1987, 
Japanese banks dominated 35 percent of international banking business and the 
share of the US was only 17.6 percent'“ . Japan has utilized foreign direct 
investment as a vital means of eliminating trade barriers to its exports and has 
profited more from this field after the appreciation of the yen in the second half of 
the 1980s'^’. The appreciation was the result of monetary accords agreed upon by 
G- 5 countries and the falling import prices due to the falling oil prices and 
decreasing dollar demand in connection with this'“ .
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Tabic 8. Japanese Foreign Direct Investment: Percentage of GNP and Amount.
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
p e r c e n ta g e 0 .5 0 .7 1.7 1.8 3 .4 4 .0
k m o u n &
; " (b il l io n s  o f  U .S .  d o lla r s )
0 .4 1.5 8 .2 19.5 4 5 .0 113.1
"Two kinds of statistics arc available for calculating Japanese fdi : one from the Ministry 
of Finance is based on the notiiication/approval, and the other is based on statistics I'or balance 
of payments. In this table, the accumulated fdi from Japan was calculated from Bank of 
■ J a p a n , Shushi Tokei Geppo, June 1969, p. 4 7; August 1976 , p. 4 7; September 1986. p. 
5 3; December 1987, p. 6 1 ; and January 1989, p. 6 3 . Calculation of c n p  in dollars is based on 
International Monetary International Financial Statisticsy July 19 72 , pp. 210- 1 3 ; January
1978, pp. 204- 7 ; August 1982, pp. 240- 4 3; June 1986, pp. 28f>-89; and July 1989, pp. 3 14 - 16 . 
Except for 19 6 5 , application of the exchange rate is based on the average annual par rate/ 
market rate.
p ‘»Accumulated amounts based on balance of payments.
Source: Y- K. Yoon. " Japanese FDIs in the 1980s," World Politics vol. 43, no. 1 ( Oct. 1990), 
p. 5.
Another advantage of foreign direct investment for Japan has been the 
utilization of labour in the home country (since labour market in Japan has been at 
a decline due to falling birth rate); in order not to stagnate manufacturing fuelled by 
technological superiority of the country. The critics of the Japanese foreign direct 
investment emphasize that the activity may cause unemployment at home or 
inadequacy of production experience and export of new techniques found as result 
of R&D efforts in Japan, 
b. Foreign Aid Policy
Another field where the relative rise of Japanese economy has become 
apparent is the use of foreign aid by Japan as a means to increase its structural 
power, that is the Japanese ability to indirectly influence the environment in which
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other states operate'^'^ During the 1950s and the 60s, the aid program of Japan has 
been affected by the country's narrow economic interests, since aid giving started 
with war reparations and economic assistance to Asian countries, especially with 
the aim of expanding Japanese exports and raw material imports from Asia'^”. After 
joining the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD in 1961, Japan has 
increased its aid efforts'^'. Following the first oil shock of 1973, Japan's efforts to 
secure supplies of energy and other resources affected its trade- oriented aid 
policy. But as the Japanese economy grew; in 1977, under pressure from other 
countries, the government announced a three year plan to double Japan's Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), extending it to Africa'Concerning assistance to 
Asian countries, Japan surpassed the US in 1977'” .
72
Figure 6. ODA to Asian Countries from Japan and the US, 1965-1985.
Source: J. Inada. " Japan's Aid Diplomacy," The International Relations of Japan , ed. K. 
Nevvland (London 1990), p. 101.
Since the late 1970s, Japanese administrations have emphasized a more 
active role in multilateral international efforts and chose foreign aid (ODA) as a 
major means of achieving this aim'^". There are certain pepuliarities of the Japanese 
ODA, stated below;
1. Emphasis has been on Asian countries
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2. Yen credits, requiring repayment of principal and interest have been prefered 
and extended especially for infrastructure projects ( as remedy for public goods 
deficiency in developing countries)
3. Aim has been encouraging efforts of development'^^
Beginning in the 1980s, a changing nature of ODA was that Japan has become 
more generous in direct aid to developing countries and has become more liberal 
with long- term development loans'^".
Table 9. Japanese Official Developmenlal Assistance, 1970-1989.
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Japan 0.458
Total Net Flows (US$ billions) 
1.148 3.353 3.797 5.634 7.342 9.134 8.949
(% OECD total) 6.57 8.28 12.28 12.90 15.36 17.65 18.98 19.16
United States 3.153 4.161 7.138 9.403 9.564 9.115 10.141 7.676
France 0.971 2.093 4.162 3.995 5.105 6.525 6.865 7.450
Germany 0.599 1.689 3.567 2.942 3.832 4.391 4.731 4.949
Italy 0.147 0.182 0.683 1.098 2.404 2.615 3.193 3.613
United Kingdom 0.500 0.904 1.854 1.530 1.737 1.871 2.645 2.587
Canada 0.337 0.880 1.075 1.631 1.695 1.885 2.347 2.320
Netherlands 0.196 0.608 1.630 1.136 1.740 2.094 2.231 2.094
Sweden 0.117 0.566 0.962 0.840 1.090 1.375 1.534 1.799
Total OECD 6.968 13.855 27.296 29.429 36.663 41.595 48.114 46.697
Sweden 0.38
As Percentage of Donor GNP 
0.82 0.78 0.86 0.85 0.88 0.86 0.97
Netherlands 0.61 0.75 0.97 0.91 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.94
France 0.66 0.62 0.63 0.78 0.70 0.74 0.72 0.78
Canada 0.41 0.54 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.44
Italy 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.40 0.35 0.39 0.42
Germany 0.32 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.39 0.39 0.41
Japan 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.32
United Kingdom 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.31
United States 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.15
Source: UAP, World DevelopmerU Report, 1990.
Source; P. J. Meeks. " Japan and Global Economic Hegemony," Japan in llic PosI- Hct’cinonic 
World, eds. Akaha and Langdon ( Colorado, 1993), p. 64.
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Japan began using ODA for supporting development of democracy and 
reduced the level of its tied aid'^’. Another characteristic of Japanese ODA has 
been the cooperation of government and private business firms in providing 
assistance. The Japan Overseas Development Corporation (JODC) exemplifies this 
trend and has been funded by both Japanese government and private sources'^ **. 
The function of this institution has been to send Japanese technicians abroad to 
train local workers and finance small sized Japanese firms investing abroad and 
import goods produced by Japanese joint ventures. In the 1980s, most of the 
projects financed have been in East Asia and especially in ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations ) countries and the Japanese have been teaching a great 
deal to these countries about industrial policy. A strong sentiment in these 
recipients has been fear of domination by Japan but still they prefer their economies 
to be tied to that of Japan's. In fact this has been a general problem of Japan, since 
Japan's money is welcome but its voice is not'^ '^ . Even in international organizations 
where Japan has made greater contributions, this has happened so. In the dollar 
terms, bilateral aid in 1980 was more than 500 percent of that in 1970 and 
multilateral aid was 1.500 percent'"". By the mid 80s Japan became a major fonder 
of World Bank Group and specialized agencies of UN‘‘'l
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Figure 7. Japan and the US Shares of DAC Bilateral ODA
Source;. D. B. Bobrow and M. A. Boyer. " Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign Aid," Review of 
International Political Economy, vol. 3, no. 1 ( Spring 1996 ), p. 108.
Figure 8. Japan and the US Shares of DAC Multilateral ODA
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AID
Source:. Bobrow and Boyer, p. 109.
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In 1987, 72 percent of Japan's loans were general untied loans, the same 
year the government announced that it would provide 500 million dollars in untied 
grants to African countries, which was the first case of untied grant aid'''^ In 1988, 
Japanese ODA totaled 9.13 billion dollars from 458 million dollars in 1970 and 
3.35 billion dollars in 1980, putting Japan neck and neck with the US, for the title 
of largest aid- donor c o u n t r y ' I n  1989, Japan passed the US in provision of 
development assistance'Foreign aid has been an important strategic means for 
Japan and it is up to Japan to further the utilization of this economic means or not, 
through sustaining a current account surplus sufficient to fulfill what is expected 
from it''".
4. The Japanese Challenge
The structural power of Japan in the international economic system has 
grown in line with positive developments in trade and finance pillars of its 
economy, since the 1950s and has become one of the advanced industrial 
countries. Japan has certain peculiarities of its own, concerning its trade, 
investment and aid relations. These have constituted a successful and growing 
economy and at the end of the 1980s, Japan has come to a point of challenging the 
US economically, which has been at a decline since the beginning of the 70s. The 
new economic status of Japan has increased the expectations of the other countries 
that it could participate more in international cooperative efforts, thus not only 
benefiting from profits of interdependence and internationalization in the economic 
sphere. The public opinion in Japan has also been changing in this direction"’. 
Japanese officials also seek to increase Japan's status and role within international
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organizations such as the IMF, WB, UN and also among the G- 7 countries' '^*. 
Meanwhile, the internationalization of Japanese economy has led to openness and 
liberalization, though limited and one- sided.
Since the 1970s, international political economy has witnessed dramatic 
changes; the one emphasized in this thesis is the economic decline of the ex­
hegemon; the US and the economic challenge to it from Japan. Under the light of 
this analysis covering the period between 1970- 1989; the US- Japan economic 
relations that have a pivotal role in world economics, is elaborated in Chapter 4; 
with an eye to the post- Cold War developments and their repercussions on this 
relationship.
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IV. THE US- JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS ( 1945- 1997 )
A. Nature of the Relations
In the US- Japanese economic relations, there is a growing interdependence 
that has its roots in the post- World War 2 circumstances, when the US played the 
role of protector and rehabilitator for the war- torn Japan; making it a dependence 
era: that of Japan on America*. Under the American security umbrella and liberal 
economy, the burdens of which were carried by the US; Japan prospered, and, by 
the early 1970s, became an important economic power. Meanwhile, the US was 
experiencing serious economic problems (such as stagnation and unemployment) 
and began to lose the status o f " hegemon of the post- war era". There has always 
been an "asymmetry" concerning the Japanese and American economies and in the 
1980s this has shown itself as the dependence of the US on the Japanese credits 
and investments, as a debtor nation .^
Economic interdependence has become inevitable in today's global 
economy whichever branch we analyze; in money, trade and finance, transactions 
have become borderless and integration with the world economy has become key 
to revival of domestic economies^. At this juncture, a continuing debate concerning 
the American and Japanese economies is whether the latter's rise has been 
detrimental to the survival of the former. American cynics blame the Japanese for 
their protectionist economic policies, believing these have fostered stagnation in 
the US. On the other hand there are scholars who believe that Japan has become a 
scapegoat and the unsuccessful economic performance of the US is the only reason
for its own economic problems. The economic frictions between the two countries, 
especially the trade issue has become a politically sensitive one, used by politicians 
with election concerns and necessitates careful management.
Today there is no power to match the qualities required of a hegemon, as 
stated in Chapter Two of this thesis. When the US and Japan are evaluated with 
the criteria for being a hegemon, such as the economic, political and military 
leverages enjoyed simultaneously, the former lacks the economic strength and the 
latter does not have the military power needed. Both of these countries are 
powerful and effective in world politics; their strengths emanating from different 
sources of power'*. The US is still militarily very strong after the end of the Cold 
War and has been facing domestic economic problems hence an economic decline 
since the early 1970s. On the other hand, Japan which makes very little defense 
expenditure has become an economic giant, as a result of its rise since the late 60s 
but especially the 80s. Under the post- Cold War global circumstances, where the 
economic relations have gained new prominence with the disappearance of the 
Soviet threat; the dialogue and cooperation between the US and Japan have 
become important determinants in the global economy. In the late 90s, the 
provision of the international economic public goods is up to the relations among 
wealthy nations (G- 7) where the American- Japanese dimension deserves special 
attention. In this chapter, this relationship (1945- 97) will be analyzed with respect 
to three spheres: trade and investment, technology, and macropolicy coordination; 
with an eye to successes and failures.
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B. Trade and Investment
1. Trade Relations
The trade issue has become the most debated problem, concerning the 
American- Japanese economic relations. According to Abdul M. Turay, trade 
frictions have emerged due to loss of US competitiveness that has made it difficult 
to improve the trade imbalance even through the devaluation of the dollar (making 
American products cheaper in foreign markets) and the saving- investment 
imbalance between the two countries which denotes a high saving rate in Japan, 
causing a low level of consumption of products also including the American 
exports. On the other hand in the US the consumption level and especially that of 
imports has always been high^ Meanwhile protectionist methods have also been an 
obstacle to improvement; ironically the US tariff rates have been higher than those 
in Japan but the utilization of non- tariff barriers ( NTBs ) by the latter worsens the 
imbalance*’. Such as Foreign Trade Zones (FTZ) where imports are stored, 
inspected, repackaged or combined with components made in Japan’.
After the first half of the Cold War, by the end of the 1970s; an economic 
cold war between the US and Japan began and was exacerbated by the penetration 
of the Japanese investors to the American economy, in the 1980s *. The 
devaluation of the dollar could not solve the problem of the large American trade 
deficit with Japan. During the reconstruction period of the 1950s, when the US 
supported Japan in rebuilding its industry, it tolerated the " keiretsu " structure of 
Japanese companies which meant that they cooperated informally; fixing prices.
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dividing markets among themselves. The US was also ready to open its market to 
Japanese exports though Japan was reluctant to do the same to America. The first 
trade deficit emerged under these circumstances, in 1968 .^ Till early 1970s, 
security cooperation had the priority and this burdensome economic cooperation 
continued. After the 1970s, though the security issue remained important; trade 
frictions rose since Japanese firms expanded in export markets and their growing 
trade surplus with the US began to threaten the already declining US economy. 
Vaguely worded trade negotiations hardly helped ease the situation'“.
Even during the reconstruction period, the US had urged Japan to tower its 
trade barriers in accordance with GATT and pressured Japan to curb its textiles 
exports to the US, by 1957. Finally in 1971, the US took the measure of adopting 
a discriminatory 10 per cent duty on Japanese imports". The trade frictions that 
began in low tech sectors such as textiles in the late 60s were carried to high tech 
industries such as semiconductors in the 1980s'^. In 1985, the American trade 
deficit reached 117.7 billion dollars while Japan had a trade surplus worth 50 
billion dollars with the US. A year later the US was taking certain measures, for 
example it wanted an agreement from Japan to guarantee American semiconductor 
producers, share of the Japanese market'^. During the same period, Japan began to 
restructure its economy, reducing the role of exports and increasing domestic 
demand in order to expand imports. The ratio of manufactured imports to Japan's 
total imports increased from 31 percent in 1985 to 50 percent in 1988- 9. An 
improvement was seen in the bilateral trade imbalance since the trade deficit 
dropped to 55.4 billion dollars in 1988, from 59.8 billion dollars in 1987'''. But
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these were not adequate to satisfy American demands; economic problems in the 
US caused the trade deficit issue to become a politically sensitive one'^
In the face of the Japanese perception that importation is equal to 
vulnerability; bilateral negotiations have proved to be fruitless. For example, 
concerning the Japanese rice market, American penetration has been very difficult 
since the Japanese see rice as a very important part of their culture and have been 
sensitive not to import rice’*^. It was in 1993 that Japan ended the ban on 
importation of rice. The Japanese believe that it is the American economic short­
comings not the Japanese NTBs that cause the trade d e f i c i t . A common belief in 
Japan has been that the country should trade and export to live and the Americans 
failed due to ignoring exportation and insisted on being a consumer society, 
interested in short- term profits rather than long- term investments, such as R&D 
activities in order to increase their competitiveness***. The 1990 Structural 
Impediments Initiative ( SII ) talks and the June 1990 US- Japanese Trade 
Agreement have stated what the two should do to put their houses in order first, 
enabling them to better their relations. According to SII, the US should put its 
fiscal house in order, improve its elementary and secondary educational system, 
increase savings, take a longer term view in its business planning and improve its 
international marketing skills and ability to commercialize innovation. Meanwhile 
Japan would open its markets, modernize its distribution system, improve housing 
and public infrastructure, change its land policies, agricultural subsidies, institute a 
social welfare system appropriate to a modern industrial society and provide
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consumers with larger fraction of fruits of Japanese economy. But verbal 
commitments have not been realized
Table 10. US- Japanese Trade Agreement, June 1990.
United States Japan
1. Cut the federal budget deficit and 
reduce government debt
Increase spending on public works to 
$2.77 trillion in the 1991-2000 decade
2. Stimulate private savings and investment 
by creating family savings accounts, 
enhancing existing individual retirement 
accounts and cutting capital gains tax
Reduce from three days to one the time 
it takes for imports to clear customs
3. Revise laws to allow for new joint 
ventures, limit product liability awards 
and stimulate investment in new plant 
equipment and research and development
Crackdown on bid-rigging, price-setting, 
oligopolistic behavior and coercive 
business practices that limit competition
4. Improve education and job training 
programs
Revise land policy to tame skyrocketing 
real estate prices
Amend regulations to liberalize trucking, 
retailing and pharmaceuticals industries
Improve patent protection for foreign 
companies.
Source: A Los Angeles Times Report; Tampa Tribune, Friday, June 29, 1990, p. 2-A.
Source: US- Japanese Trade Agreement, June, 1990. Conteh- Morgan, p. 127.
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With the end of the Cold War thus that of the military and ideological 
threat Americans were faced with, they turned their attention to issues of economic 
well- being at home and economic competition abroad^ *^ . In 1992, the trade white 
paper issued by MITI stated that Japan should increase domestic demand for 
making trade more reciprocaPV Again the same year. President Bush during his 
visit to Tokyo asked for assistance to the troubled US automobile industry^^. But 
the closure of Japan’s market and the vulnerability the US experienced due to its 
interdependence with Japan continued. The July 1993 “framework” agreement 
between the two countries committed the US to deficit reduction, pledging 
continued openness of American markets and committed Japan to reduce its global 
current account surplus and to new policies to increase imports. But the two 
parties could not agree on the time span and extent of these reduction and 
expansions'^. Unable to meet the deadlines, talks were suspended by 1994. A little 
improvement in the merchandise trade deficit took place the same year due to 
increase in the volume of US exports
In 1995 the US had a surplus with Japan in services trade - more than 17 
billion dollars-. But in general Japanese limitations on importation continue. Also 
bilateral and sectoral trade negotiations as a means to solve problems has come to 
its limits. What is interesting is that today the US can not do anything about 
Japanese protectionism because Japan imports substantial amounts of products and 
services, and adheres to most of the international rules, disciplines of World Trade 
Organization and the OECD^^ Therefore the US does not have a convincing 
argument to remove Japanese barriers to trade. Structural adjustments in both
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countries rather than sectoral trade confrontations to open certain markets can ease 
the situation. International consensus and pressure through G-7, WTO and OECD 
may help more, by discussing issues at multilateral forums. This would also be in 
the interests of other states since US- Japanese managed trade would be 
detrimental to them, replacing free trade with regionalization. This trend can be 
stopped by cooperation, which necessitates the existence of similar perceptions and 
this is the point the difficulty stems from^ .^ But this may even be a competitive type 
of cooperation because of the mutual economic vulnerability caused by increasing 
interdependence. Some scholars e.g. Conteh- Morgan evaluate the negotiation 
attempts of the two countries as the process of developing a separate trade regime 
to regulate the US- Japanese economic relations^^ . But these have not reached 
either American development or Japanese openness in trade, to the extent aimed
for.
2. Investment
The American overseas investments that have accelerated in the post- 
WW2 era have been surpassed by those of other leading economic powers, one of 
them being Japan. Especially in the 1980s, Japanese foreign direct investment in 
the US has increased dramatically, adding one more area of friction to the 
economic relations of the two countries. Though economists stress the advantages 
of liberal trade and investment policies and show the weaknesses of the American 
economy, American politicians running for re- election have turned the issue into a 
politically sensitive one, in the form of worries about “ the selling of America to 
foreign investors” *^. In today’s interdependent world economy, what the US needs
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is improvement in its competitiveness, rather than limiting Japanese investments 
and labeling this country as a scapegoat^^. The dollar devaluations of the 80s were 
aimed at increasing American exports but at the same time they decreased the costs 
of Japanese investments in the US assets and helped finance the huge US budget 
deficit and military spending, without taking the long- term effects into 
consideration, as Japan in time increased its market shares in America^".
By the end of 1987, Japan had direct investments worth 33 billion dollars in 
the US, meanwhile US direct holdings were worth only 14.3 billion dollars but this 
number made the US Japan’s largest foreign investor^*. The high rate of savings 
and investments in Japan has made the country home of world’s leading enterprises 
investing abroad^^ and the US with its high consumption level and twin deficits of 
trade and budget, has been receptive to these multinationals^^. In the 1990s, a 
growing trend for Japan has been manufacturing more overseas than exporting 
from home. This change in the Japanese economy has taken place with divergence 
of corporate, public and private interests the harmony of which once made the 
country an export leviathan^“*. Breaking their keiretsu relationships, the Japanese 
MNCs are competing even at home, reflecting “a truly multinational set of norms 
for corporate behavior”^  ^ Rather than American or Japanese business styles as in 
the 1980s, best practices of each are merged and applied. Under the light of these 
developments; the US has to survive in a more challenging and competitive 
environment and the increasing economic interdependence worldwide, increases 
the vulnerability of the US and Japan vis- a- vis each other.
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C. Technological Developments
Among the most debated issues in the American- Japanese economic relations, 
“competitiveness” in technology also has an important place, since know- how is 
the basis of production. The US is at the verge of losing technological leaderships^. 
Other than inadequacy of economic resources to be devoted to R&D in the face of 
domestic economic problems and huge military expenditures^’; the US seems to 
experience a disadvantage in access to Japanese know- how though the latter is 
more advantageous. This asymmetry also has its roots in the post- WW2 era when 
the US permitted transfer of its technology to Japan, for the technology is the basis 
of economic recovery.
In the occupation era, American management training exports, industrial 
statisticians and other specialists went to Japan in order to advise on selling abroad 
for surviving economically^*. Japanese students began to study at American 
universities^^. In this way, the US licensed technology to Japan. But even after 
Japan prospered and became able to afford scientific and technological studies; the 
structural difference between the ways Japan and the US conducted research, made 
it difficult for the US to reach the findings of Japanese studies. This is because the 
US develops technology at universities (basic research) which is open to academic 
consortia but Japan uses industrial laboratories (process and production 
technology), restricting the use of findings'*“. Also, few US scientists do research in 
Japanese but the Japanese are more willing to learn English and study in America. 
Thus there are certain structural and economic obstacles for the US. Americans
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should save more in order to spend on improving their technological capability and 
production system‘*\
A more optimistic view by Conteh- Morgan is that Japan and the US 
cooperate even in military technology and the triumph of this was apparent during 
the Gulf War, concerning the weapons used. Japanese machine tools have become 
vital for the American military. Still there are suspicions and conflicts which can be 
evaluated as seeds of technonationalism. A common belief in the US is that Japan 
cooperates with the US in R&D for access to advanced technology and is good at
exploiting US know- how. On the other hand, the Japanese state that the US 
engages Japan to its projects when it cannot afford them“’^ . For example in 1983 
the US government funded 29.3 percent of all business R&D expenditures while 
the Japanese spent just 1.8 percent. In the same year, the US has started using 
retaliatory measures for Japanese protection of patents'* .^ In the face of continuing 
American demands for reciprocal flows of technology from Japan; 
technonationalism is an important threat and obstacle to attempts for increasing 
competitiveness'*' .^ Therefore science and technology are among areas necessitating 
conscious coordination and cooperation.
D. Macropolicy Coordination
Macropolicy coordination proves to be a difficult arena for cooperation, 
due to different priorities, structures of different economies; though it is extremely 
important in the face of lack of a hegemon dominating the world economy''^ The 
US and Japan; the former ex- hegemon and world’s largest debtor and the latter as 
the new financial leader and world’s largest creditor have an important place in the
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coordination efforts. According to Takatoshi Ito, policy coordination is 
advantageous for two reasons; the first is spillover effects of welfare improvements 
and the development of the world economy rather than effects of contrasting 
national efforts. The second is that through coordination; governments are 
prevented from taking short- sighted policies especially when they face political 
difficulties'“^ . On the other hand, though theories support coordination, in the real 
world, it is very difficult for countries to have the same “true” model of the world 
economy, cooperate on it and enjoy benefits'*’.
An analysis of the second half of the 1980s when coordination efforts were 
frequent, shows the difficulties and weaknesses of multilateral management; 
concerning the international monetary system, free trade and institutional 
harmonization. The Plaza (1985) and Louvre (1987) Accords that are analyzed in 
Chapter Three have proved to be fruitless in the long- run due to weakness of the 
American economy and the unwillingness of major developed countries to bear the 
burdens of other economies. The positive short- term effect of the Plaza 
Agreement (September 22, 1985) on the US - depreciation of the dollar- should 
not be taken as a realistic model for future coordination'**. This has not caused 
improvements with regard to trade and capital account imbalances. Still the accord 
is a unique example of a deal where the G- 7 have agreed on more than just a 
willingness to cooperate, which may for the future prove to be the difficulty of 
collective leadership up to the hegemonic stability theory.
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E. Global Impact of the US- Japanese Economic Relations
An overall view on the US- Japanese relations in spheres of trade, 
investment, technology and macropolicy coordination gives a pessimistic picture if 
evaluated with high expectations for cooperation. Especially when considering the 
decline in the economic capabilities of the ex- hegemon, the US and the economic 
challenge rising from Japan; cooperation between the two countries becomes even 
more important. Of course they are not the only ones to carry out the responsibility 
of sustaining harmony in global economic relations, the cooperation of all countries 
is needed. But as the US and Japan together account for 40 percent of world GNP, 
the vitality of their contribution is obvious'*  ^ After the end of the Cold War; the 
perceptions, interests of the two seem to differ more but given the increasing 
interdependence of the world economy and the priority of the economic issues, 
cooperation is inevitable. But the success of the attempts necessitate structural 
changes in the economies of the US and Japan and greater harmonization. After an 
analysis of the relations. Chapter Five dwells on the future prospects for the 
coordination of international economic relations with regard to American and 
Japanese contributions to it. It evaluates possible scenarios, according to the 
hegemonic stability theory.
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V. CONCLUSION
Up to this point, this thesis has shown the complex nature of the US- 
Japanese relations, the basis of which has been the "1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security" creating a Japanese dependence on the US for its 
defense and foreseeing economic development for the country. But the 1970s, 
during which the US has declined economically, lost its hegemonic abilities and at 
the same time been challenged by Japan; have brought a new characteristic to the 
relationship: mutual vulnerability and increasing need for collaboration. An 
important difficulty stems from the fact that the two countries have different 
perceptions. For example for the Americans, security and economic issues have 
always been closely related and the US has accepted making economic concessions 
for the sake of security interests. On the other hand for the Japanese these two 
spheres have been treated as totally different ones, giving priority to the economic 
sphere ’.
After the end of the Cold War; with the evaporation of the communist 
threat combined with the extermination of the hegemonic capabilities of the US ( in 
the economic arena not the military ) since the 1970s; economic frictions between 
the US and Japan have come to the fore. There are strong sentiments in both 
countries vis- a- vis each other. The opinion poll conducted by Louis Harris and 
Associates in July 1989 in the US showed that 68 percent of American respondents 
saw the economic threat from Japan as a bigger threat to the future of their country
than the Soviet military threat. Meanwhile, the Yomiuri Shimbun poll of July 1991 
in Japan showed 24 percent rating the US as a security threat versus 22 percent 
for the SU and another poll stated that only 48 percent of respondents believed 
that their country benefited from its security relationship with the US .^ Long 
standing biases and economic rivalry may be more effective in the face of lack of a 
common enemy which used to be the SU and a hegemon ( that used to be the US ) 
to regulate international economic regimes ( money, trade and finance relations). 
The American market still is the largest, the dollar is a major currency in the 
monetary system and the US has unmatched nuclear capabilities’, but these are not 
adequate to make the ex- hegemon reassume its role. Under these circumstances 
multilateral cooperation not only with Japan but with other advanced countries 
becomes vital for a liberal economic world order to function.
According to E. Ahmad, the American accusations on Japan that the latter 
uses harsh, unfair capitalist practices, are similar to those argued by the developing 
nations regarding their relations with the Western countries. Therefore the US 
should catch up with Japan; since there is no more a paternalistic relationship 
between the two countries, this is the most the US can do'‘. Many political 
economy scholars and the Japanese themselves believe that Japan is not ready for a 
global leadership role. To assume such a responsibility, even if Japan had all the 
capability, the political will should exist as well^ Still, Japan has begun questioning 
its dependence on the US and its new generation wants to take more steps alone. 
The Pacific Basin has become a region of competition for Japan and the US since 
the latter is cautious about prospects of Japanese leadership in the region because
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Japan seems eager and capable of playing such a role. Though the Asian nations 
are hesitant about relying on Japan which once had imperialist aims on them, the 
US does not want to risk the large market there .^ Hence this is one of the conflict- 
ridden issues but there is a reasonable consensus that the leadership prospects for 
Japan is limited to the Far East and this is possible as long as the Pacific nations are 
ready to see Japan as a model, rather than a rival.
According to the hegemonic stability theory, there are four possible 
scenarios for the future, debated by political scientists
1. A second phase for the Pax Americana,
2. Bigemony shared by the US and Japan,
3. Pax Consortia among major advanced states,
4. Pax Nipponica with the rise of Japan as the new hegemon.
The first scenario foresees a continuation of the US leadership in the 
framework of the same division of labor for the US and Japan which means that 
Japan continues financing US foreign policy goals which it conceives to be the 
same as its own perceptions, despite the end of the Cold War. Therefore Japan 
supports the endurance of the American hegemony and continues with the Yoshida 
Doctrine of conservative pacifism**. The second option, bigemony denotes a co­
equal leadership of the US and Japan as a result of the integration of the economies 
of the two countries. According to this model, the economic strength of Japan also 
turns into military power and the US and Japan cooperate in this field too, sharing 
equal status. Pax Consortis reflects a truly idealist balance of power system with no 
hegemon, where many consortia among major actors in the form of different
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coalitions and agreements regulate the inter- state relations'·'. Here, the civilian role 
of Japan shows itself in fostering a world free from military solutions, as the 
economic issues have become prior to military ones in the aftermath of the Cold 
War. It is an active economic policy making the country politically powerful and 
effective. But the most active role for Japan is put forth by the fourth scenario: Pax 
Nipponica which is Japan's rise to hegemony becoming number one and governing 
international regimes.
Japan has really economically challenged the US but for becoming a 
hegemon - according to the neorealist theory- supremacy in the military sphere is a 
prerequisite too. Therefore for this model, a neutralisation of nuclear powers is 
needed for Japan to lead the security arena'®. Elimination of military solutions is a 
nice hope for the future but is not realistic. The continuing post Cold War regional 
rivalries and the armed solutions to these prove that the trend is not in the direction 
of nonmilitarization. The Gulf and Bosnian wars are perhaps the most impressive 
examples. The national interests of states continue to rival with those of each other 
and economic frictions, ethnic conflicts, territorial claims... replace the ideology 
based problems of the Cold War. To sum up, Japanese hegemony or a joint 
leadership of the US- Japanese ( neglecting the economic frictions the two 
countries have)are less probable than the endurance of status quo, a second phase 
of Pax Americana supported by Japan and other advanced countries, including an 
enlarged European Community which in the longer term may take the form of Pax 
Consortis. But the likelihood of this prospect is limited since it would necessitate
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the circumstances required for a smoothly functioning United Nations; so that the 
developed countries (G-7) could act as banker, gendarme and environmentalist"
This thesis has analyzed dynamism in the "economic" relations between the 
US and Japan, underlining the weaknesses in the American economy and the 
developments in the latter’s economy. Hence Japan has come to a position to 
challenge the ex- hegemon economically. Taking the “hegemony” concept as a 
whole “not dividing it to different fields” (such as military hegemony, economic 
hegemony), the study concludes that today there is no hegemon and the most 
probable picture is one of multilateral cooperation to sustain the American origined 
international regimes, necessitating the advanced countries to see this in their 
interest. On the other hand; an overall economic analysis of the US- Japan relations 
proves a challenge from Japan, enough to create a real interdependence which at 
the same time acts as a catalyst for cooperation, though it can be of an adversarial 
type, in the face of mutual vulnerability.
The existence of economic conflicts such as the trade and investment 
imbalances, difficulty of macropolicy coordination and asymmetry in technology 
transfers do not necessitate an "economic war” or a “second cold war”. Still a 
cooperation limited to the US- Japan axis would not be adequate to regulate an 
orderly, liberal world economy; a total neglect of the other advanced countries 
especially the European Community would be a wrong understanding. As F. 
Bergsten states, there are today, three important economic poles: the US, Japan 
and the EC". Therefore they are to share power and responsibility and their 
currencies will be the world’s reserve currencies, determining the magnitude of the
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transactions. Maximum harmony in the economic relations of Japan and the US 
would be the locomotive for coordination and cooperation efforts at the global 
scale.
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